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Abstract
By the year 2016 every member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has to comply with its
agreement on the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR), Trade-related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPS or the Agreement). This implies that each country party to this
multilateral trade agreement is obliged to institutionalize the protection of intellectual property
rights (IPR) into its national framework. Developed country members have few, if any, changes
to make to their legislations in order to become TRIPS compliant. Most developing country
members, however, would have to make significant changes in their system to accommodate this
harmonized IPR protection regime.
This thesis attempts to examine how developing countries are affected by the TRIPS imple-
mentation. In particular, I examine whether compliance with the Agreement facilitates devel-
oping countries’ exposure to foreign technologies.
For the first paper, I build an index that captures fifty-three developing countries’ compli-
ance with TRIPS by consulting their Trade Policy Review and TRIPS Council review reports,
cross-referencing them to their national legislations. I find that most developing countries take
advantage of the transition period flexibility offered by the Agreement and that these implemen-
tation efforts are relatively independent from their income levels. In addition, countries that are
party to regional trade agreements that specify TRIPS protection tend to be compliant earlier
than the rest.
In the second paper, I apply the TRIPS index to three channels of accessing foreign tech-
nology: trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) and licensing activities. I find that countries’
compliance with the Agreement has positive impact on FDI inflows, some on inward licensing
activities but none on imports. I then argue that actual enforcement of the in-book TRIPS
compliance is important in facilitating access to foreign technologies and include an enforcement
index. This enforcement proxy is not to be confused with the statutory enforcements mandated
by TRIPS itself. When enforcement of the TRIPS compliance is taken into consideration, I ob-
serve that on average TRIPS implementation and its enforcement facilitate access to the foreign
technologies for developing countries, depending on their level of imitative abilities.
The last paper delves further and investigates how local firms are affected by the strength-
ened IPR protection in using foreign technologies. Using a unique database from the Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor on entrepreneurship, I examine how TRIPS implementation affects
local entrepreneurs’ exploitation of those technologies. I find significant and adverse effects of
the IPR reform, which varies according to industrial sectors and categories. The results suggest
that stronger IPR protection, via TRIPS implementation, raises the cost of using the foreign
technology for entrepreneurs in developing countries.
Keywords: intellectual property rights, developing countries, access to knowledge
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Re´sume´
D’ici 2016, tout pays membre de l’Organisation Mondiale du Commerce (OMC) devront se
conformer aux Accord sur les Aspects des Droits de Proprie´te´ Intellectuelle qui touchent au
Commerce (ADPIC ou l’Accord). Cet accord requiert de chaque pays membre la mise en place
d’institutions nationale en charge de protection des droits de proprie´te´ intellectuelle (DPI). Peu
de changements (voire aucun) sont a` pre´voir dans le syste`me le´gislatif des pays de´veloppe´s.
Cependant, la plupart des pays en voie de de´veloppement (PVD) devront modifier leur syste`me
de fac¸on significative pour inte´grer ce nouveau re´gime.
La pre´sente the`se e´tudie la fac¸on dont les PVD sont influence´s par la mise en œuvre des
accords ADPIC. Nous regardons plus particulie`rement si cette mise en œuvre facilite l’exposition
des PVD aux technologies e´trange`res.
Dans un premier chapitre, nous examinons les rapports des Me´canisme d’examen des poli-
tiques commerciales, ADPIC Conseil et les le´gislations nationales de cinquant-trois PVD afin
de construire un indice de conformite´ aux ADPIC. Nous trouvons que la plupart des PVD ont
profite´ de la pe´riod de transition offerte par l’Accord et que les efforts d’imple´mentation sont
relativement inde´pendants du niveau de revenu national. De plus, les pays signataires d’accords
commerciaux re´gionaux, incluant des ADPIC spe´cifique a` la protection des DPI ont tendance a`
eˆtre compatible avec l’Accord plus toˆt que les autres.
En appliquant cet indice a` trois canaus d’acce´s aux technologies e´trange`res: commerce,
investissment e´tranger direct (IED) et activite´s de licence. Nous trouvons que la conformite´ des
pays a` ADPIC a un impact positif sur les IED, un peu d’impact sure les activite´s de license
et aucun sur les commerces. Nous argumentons que la mise en application des le´gislation des
ADPIC est plus importante pour faciliter l’exposition aux technologies e´trange`res et inclut
un index de renforcement pour justifier ceci. Nous observons ensuite que la conciliation aux
ADPIC facilite ge´ne´ralment l’acce`s aux technologies e´trange`res pour les PVD, selon leur niveau
de capacite´s imitatifs.
Le dernier chapitre examine comment les entrepreises locales sont influene´es par le renforce-
ment de la protection des DPI dan l’utilisation de technologies e´trange`res. En utlisant une base
de donnee´es unique du Global Entrepreneurship Monitor sur l’entreprenariat, nous examinons
comments le mise en œuvre des ADPIC affectent l’exploitation des technologies e´trange`res par
les entrepreneurs locaux. Nous trouvons des effects important et adverses de la re´forme des
DPI, qui varie selon les secteurs et cate´gories industriels. Les re´sultant sugge`rent que le ren-
forcement de la protection des DPI, en passant par la mise en œuvre l’Accord, augmente le couˆt
de l’utilisation des nouvelles technologies pour les entrepreneurs des PVD.
Mot-cle´: droits de proprie´te´ intellectuelle, pays en voie de de´veloppement, l’exposition aux
technologies e´trange`res
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In a developing country like the Philippines, what are the best institutional arrange-
ments for gaining access to the knowledge that already exists in the rest of the
world?
— Paul Romer (1994)
The Origins of Endogenous Growth
This collection of three research papers attempts to answer the question above by investigat-
ing if strengthened intellectual property rights (IPR) via the implementation of the Trade-related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement facilitates access to knowledge devel-
oped elsewhere for developing countries. I ask, “[D]oes TRIPS implementation help developing
countries access foreign technologies?”
1.1 Access to technology
Research work on endogenous growth theory underscores knowledge production as the source
of sustained economic growth (see Romer, 1986, 1987, 1990, 1993; Lucas, 1988; Rebelo, 1991;
Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman and Helpman, 1991). The AK model, as it is generally
known, is based on the usual production function model:
Y = K1−α (ALY )α (1.1)
A = δLA (1.2)
where Y is output, A is productivity, knowledge or ideas, K is capital, both human and
physical, and δ parameterizes the efficiency of research and development (R&D). This theory
argues that countries can endeavor to economically grow at a constant and consistent rate by
innovating, as proxied by the R&D efficiency parameter. Therefore, any government intervention
that encourages R&D would also contribute to economic growth.
Most developing countries do not have the capacity to generate new to the world knowledge
and tend to be technology importers. Fig. 1.1 highlights the skewed production of innovation
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in developed countries, as measured by the count of patent application and scientific journals.
By accessing foreign technologies, developing countries may be able to jump past the innovation
production hurdle, and experience constant economic growth a` la the endogenous model. In
addition, accessing foreign technologies is beneficial for developing countries because it would
reduce the duplicative R&D cost of producing the technology. Thus, access this knowledge from
abroad becomes important for developing countries, as underscored by the recent World Bank’s
annual Global Economic Prospects report (World Bank, 2008).
Figure 1.1: Global comparison of scientific innovation and invention across income levels
For developing countries, accessing foreign technology is only a partial solution to rectifying
its lack of capacity to generate sufficient innovation levels. A much more crucial matter is the
spillover generated from these technologies, in particular knowledge spillovers.1
East Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are examples of countries that
experienced knowledge spillover when they were exposed to foreign technologies. This exposure
enabled them to develop their innovative capacities through learning by doing and by using
the foreign technologies (Kumar, 2002). By reverse-engineering the foreign goods acquired,
these countries were able to access the technologies embodied in them to enrich their pool of
knowledge, which eventually led to their technological competitiveness in the global market.
But developing countries are not the only ones who “borrowed” new technologies from abroad.
Historically, European countries and the United States engaged in this “borrowing” undertaking
as well, as pointed out by Rosenberg (1994) and Granstrand (1999).
Research evidence show that countries have been able to free ride on technologies developed
elsewhere, assimilate and exploit these foreign technologies to improve their economic activities
1Knowledge spillover takes place when firms can partake in the benefits of R&D expenditure exerted by an
innovative firm without sharing the R&D costs that the innovative firm incurred. This externality is possible
because of the non-excludability and non-rivalry traits of knowledge. See Branstetter (1998) for a good differen-
tiation between spillover types, and how they relate to endogenous growth. Branstetter refers to Griliches (1992)
to help explain the importance of knowledge spillover, Griliches’ non-pecuniary spillover, to economic growth.
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(see Granstrand, 1999; Rosenberg, 1994). This free riding does not bode well for social wel-
fare. Arrow (1962) convincingly argues that under perfect competition, the level of knowledge
production is well below social optimal level. He pushes for the institutionalization of incentive
mechanisms that would encourage this production. An example of such mechanism is the gov-
ernment sanctioned monopoly rights grant of IPR protection; of which patent policy is the most
controversial.
1.2 IPR protection
Machlup and Penrose (1950) lists four justifications for patent protection in the nineteenth
century: (i) inventor’s natural right to protection of her invention; (ii) fairness to ensure the
inventor’s just reward for the invention, (iii) encouragement to innovate; and, (iv) means to
induce disclosure of the invention. Patent protection accords a temporary marketing monopoly
to the inventor in exchange for the disclosure of that knowledge. Debate on these lines of
thought, the assertions and assumptions echo today in discussions of the scope and breadth of
patent protection as well as the overall contention of patent as an effective means of providing
incentive to innovate.
Scholars are still uncertain as to the importance and appropriateness of patent protection
in encouraging innovation even if more information is being gathered on the subject matter.
Mansfield (1985) finds that even with patent protection 60% of innovations are imitated within
four years of their commercialization. Foray (2004) argues that industries that face high R&D
costs, imitation and reverse engineering is widespread and the final cost of production man-
ufacturing is low can benefit from patent protection. The pharmaceutical and chemical dye
industries are prime examples of where patent protection have been important for innovation in
the field (Mansfield, 1986).
But for some other industries patenting is more of a strategic behavior (Cohen et al., 2000;
Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). Furthermore, patent protection makes it more difficult and costly for
follow-on innovations (Scotchmer, 1996). However, even if patent protection is questionable as
a mechanism to generate innovation, my interest in it is whether this appropriability regime
facilitates developing countries’ access to foreign technologies.
Developing countries have been exposed to foreign technologies because of globalization
(Archibugi and Pietrobelli, 2003a). Relatively open trading regimes and progress of the in-
formation and communication technologies (ICT) have increased the speed with which new
technologies are diffused across the globe. Some developing countries have taken advantage of
this globalization force, and under weak IPR regimes, have accessed, assimilated and adapted
new technologies to their local markets as in the case of Taiwan and its local entrepreneurs (Yu,
1998). A telling tale of how imitation of foreign technologies can help developing countries is
in the case of Romania and the development of its technology industry. The Romanian presi-
dent Traian Basescu jokingly announced to Bill Gates in February 2007 that pirated versions of
Gates’ Microsoft software helped build Romania’s technology industry (see Zoeller, 2007).
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The emergence of rivals from countries with weak appropriability regimes pose significant risk
for innovators of new technologies, especially when these innovators target consumers in foreign
markets. Competitors’ blatant imitation of the new technologies reduces the innovators’ returns
to innovation and creates tension in the global market for trade in technological goods. Industries
adversely affected by the weak global IPR protection heavily lobbied their representatives to
address the matter. This successful lobbying, in addition to the tradeoff developing countries
managed to negotiate during the Uruguay Round of negotiations, led to the inclusion of an
agreement setting the international standard for IPR protection known as the Trade-related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement.
1.3 TRIPS & developing countries
In 1973 Edith Penrose wrote an article in The Economic Journal discussing the merits of adopt-
ing the international patenting agreement known as Convention of the Union for the Protection
for the Protection of Industrial Property. She was unable to conclusively determine whether the
protection of IPR was beneficial or costly for developing countries (Penrose, 1973).2 Developing
countries tend to be technology dependent. As such, Penrose was cautious to point out that de-
veloping countries would gain little, if nothing, from its implementation. But she acknowledges
that IPR protection may be important for the few inventors in these countries.
Despite Penrose’s argument against global IPR protection and because of the nature of in-
ternational negotiations, most of the developing countries today have to implement the TRIPS
agreement. TRIPS is part of a package of agreements concluded from the Uruguay Round of
negotiations in 1995, administered by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Geneva, Switzer-
land. It is the first multilateral attempt at setting an enforceable minimum IPR protection for
its member countries. Its main objective is to reduce the legal uncertainty in the multilateral
trading framework and enable cross-border trade in IPR-sensitive goods, securing investments
of these goods which are directed toward global markets.3
Previous empirical studies provide evidence that strengthened IPR protection increases coun-
tries’ access to foreign technology through trade (Smith, 1999; Fink and Braga, 1999; Maskus
and Penubarti, 1995; Rapp and Rozek, 1990), encourage inflow of FDI (Park and Lippoldt, 2007;
Javorcik, 2004; Lee and Mansfield, 1996; Seyoum, 1996) and licensing activities (Wakasugi, 2007;
Co, 2007; Yang and Maskus, 2001), with a few notable exceptions such as the findings by Kondo
(1995) and Ferrantino (1993).4 However most of these studies overlook one important factor in
their analysis of the effect of strengthening IPR protection: the level of IPR protection in the
2This international convention was administered by the United International Bureaux for the Protection of
Intellectual Property (BIRPI) in Geneva, Switzerland and has been replaced by the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO).
3Ironically in the nineteenth century free traders in Germany were the main opposers of the IPR protection,
condemning the patent laws because it restricted their trading activities (Machlup and Penrose, 1950, p.4).
4There is also abundant literature on the effects of patent system on innovation and innovative activities.
However this branch of research investigation focuses more on how IPR protection facilitates domestic innovative
activities, whereas throughout this paper I focus on accessing foreign technologies. Consult the paper by Hall
(2007) for a good overview of the state of the art on this subject.
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countries studied are endogenously determined by the countries’ economic environment (North
and Thomas, 1970; Landes and Posner, 2004).
Countries with high levels of IPR protection tend to have high levels of economic development
(Rapp and Rozek, 1990). And countries with high levels of economic development also tend to
have high innovative capacities. Thus if we link levels of IPR protection to levels of innovative
capacities, then further strengthening of these countries’ IPR protection level possibly generates
more innovation outputs as measured by patent applications and scientific literature.
But will the result that strengthened IPR protection lead to increased access to foreign tech-
nologies still hold if the level of IPR protection is no longer endogenously determined? Putting
it differently, will developing countries’ implementation of the TRIPS agreement, regardless of
their levels of economic development, facilitate access to foreign technologies?
1.4 Research
My three papers examine whether developing countries’ implementation of their TRIPS obliga-
tions increases their exposure to foreign technologies. In the first paper I build an index that
captures countries’ compliance with TRIPS by examining these countries’ TRIPS review reports
and their national legislations. Then I apply the index to three channels of accessing foreign
technology: trade, FDI and licensing activities to investigate how TRIPS compliance influences
these channels of access for the second paper. And in the last paper, I examine how implemen-
tation of the TRIPS agreement affects exploitation of foreign technologies by entrepreneurs in
developing countries.
The first paper builds an IPR index based on the TRIPS agreement for the period 1994 –
2007. Unsatisfied with the available IPR indexes available, I consult national IPR legislations,
various IPR-specific reports, and legal experts and practitioners, whenever possible, to con-
struct the index for 53 developing countries. Analysis of the data shows three implementation
trends. Firstly, almost all developing countries take advantage of the transition period clause
of the Agreement (Art. 65), and in some cases exceed the TRIPS implementation deadline for
developing countries, 2000. Secondly, implementation efforts of developing countries vary, and
not necessarily because of their income levels. Lastly, countries in regional trade agreements
(RTAs) that include IPR obligations tend to comply with TRIPS earlier than the rest. The re-
sults confirm that the TRIPS agreement leads to a convergence of global IPR protection across
countries. It also makes the case that the Agreement’s implementation is an external factor,
neither strongly influenced by the country’s level of economic development nor by its level of
innovation capacity. This index can be used as a natural experiment to understand how IPR
influences economic activities and behaviors.
The result of paper one illuminates how the TRIPS agreement changes the global IPR
landscape. Countries with weak innovative capacities now find themselves enforcing strong IPR
protection. This juxtaposition of full TRIPS implementation and weak capacity to innovate is
likely to create an economic problem. These countries may find that the cost of implementing
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and enforcing the IPR protection is higher than its benefits, especially in the short run. For
example, the increase in patent applications registered by their national patent offices may
reflect increase in foreign patenting rather than increase in innovative activities produced by the
country.
In my second paper I endeavor to apply my newly built index on developing countries’
exposure to foreign technologies. Controlling for country-specific factors, I find that developing
countries’ compliance with the TRIPS agreement increases access to foreign technology through
foreign direct investment (FDI) and licensing. When I include an enforcement term to proxy
for actual enforcement of the TRIPS obligations, I observe significant impact of the TRIPS
implementation on all three channels of access to foreign technologies which varies according to
their imitative abilities.
The last paper examines how TRIPS implementation affects exploitation of foreign tech-
nologies. Using the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) database on entrepreneurship,
I find significant and adverse effects of TRIPS. The level of impact changes according to the
industrial sectors and categories of the entrepreneurial activities. The results show that stronger
IPR protection, via TRIPS implementation, raises the cost to using new technology by the en-
trepreneurs in developing countries. I suggest that TRIPS’ negative effect on the exploitation of
foreign technologies in developing countries may be attributable to the higher cost of acquiring
them.
The two papers above, paper two and paper three, are complementary and give us a better
understanding of how TRIPS influences the diffusion of foreign technologies in developing coun-
tries. Most empirical literature that analyze issues related to IPR reform only consider the access
to foreign technology problem but stop short of investigating how local firms are affected by this
change. In short, these literature may give an over-optimistic view of the current situation.
Chapter 2
How compliant are developing
countries with their TRIPS
compliance?
2.1 Introduction
Arrow (1962) underscores the importance of having an incentive mechanism that would en-
courage innovative activities, one of which is the government sanctioned monopoly rights of
intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. He argues that market failure of knowledge pro-
duction justifies the institutionalization of such mechanism, encouraging activities that generate
positive spillover effects. The demandeurs of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights agreement (TRIPS, or the Agreement) during the Uruguay Round of negotiations have
contended that the lack of IPR protection in some countries hinder the free flow of goods and
services worldwide, and so have pushed for global IPR protection. However research on examin-
ing the relevance of having IPR protection produce inconclusive results. Evidences compile on
how IPR protection, in particular the patent system, impacts innovation (Lerner, 2002; Bald-
win et al., 2001; Kortum and Lerner, 1998; Mansfield et al., 1981), innovative activities (Qian,
2008; Kanwar and Evenson, 2003; Sakakibara and Branstetter, 2001; Varsakelis, 2001; Park
and Ginarte, 1997; Mansfield, 1994), composition of those activities (Moser, 2005; Mansfield,
1993), sequential innovation (Bessen and Mashkin, 2006; Green and Schotchmer, 1995), trade
(Smith, 1999; Maskus and Penubarti, 1995; Ferrantino, 1993), foreign direct investments (Javor-
cik, 2004; Lee and Mansfield, 1996; Mansfield, 1994) and welfare (Falvey et al., 2006; Thompson
and Rushing, 1999; Deardoff, 1992; Rapp and Rozek, 1990).1 The results of these studies show
mixed assessments on the impact of IPR protection on domestic economic activities. In sum,
1For a good overview on how patent system affects innovation see Hall (2007).
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researchers have been unable to clearly establish causal relationship between IPR systems and
economic development (Granstrand, 1999).
The advent of TRIPS and the near-universal influence of this global IPR system necessitates
careful scrutiny of this Agreement on developing countries’ economic activities. This paper builds
a TRIPS-compliant index to serve this purpose by tracking developing countries’ compliance with
this multilateral agreement. I examine the national legislations, various IPR-specific reports
and consult practitioners and legal experts, wherever possible, to achieve this goal. My research
focuses on original member countries of to the World Trade Organization (WTO) who have
acceded in the year 1995, and tracks how the IPR regimes in these countries change in-line with
their TRIPS obligations.
Analysis of the data shows three implementation trends. Firstly, almost all developing
countries take advantage of the transition periods clause of the Agreement (Art. 65), and in
some cases have exceeded the TRIPS implementation deadline for developing countries, the year
2000. Secondly, implementation efforts of developing countries vary, and not necessarily because
of their income levels. Lastly, countries in regional trade agreements (RTAs) that include IPR
obligations tend to comply with TRIPS earlier than the rest. The results confirm that the TRIPS
agreement leads to a convergence of global IPR protection across countries. It also makes the
case that the Agreement’s implementation is an external factor, not entirely influenced by the
country’s level of economic development.
The lack of endogenous attribution of IPR level to economic development and convergence
of global IPR across countries lead to the possibility of using this index as a natural experiment
to understand how IPR influences economic activities and behaviors.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview of available
IPR indexes and argues in favor of a new TRIPS-compliant index. Section 2.3 describes how
implementation of the TRIPS agreement changes the global IPR landscape. Section 2.4 explains
how the index is constructed and discusses some drawbacks of the index. The penultimate
section analyzes the results of the data collected on various IPR legislations and the final section
concludes with a brief discussion.
2.2 IPR quantification
Quantification of IPR systems through an index is an imperfect method to capture the vari-
ances in IPR legislations across countries. However these indexes provide means to investigating
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whether and to what extent IPR regimes explain variations in economic activities across coun-
tries.
This section underlines the need for a TRIPS-specific IPR index and discusses how currently
available IPR indexes are unsatisfactory to use in studying the impact of TRIPS implementation
on economic activities. I also provide an overview of some IPR indexes in detail as a few of
them are used to construct the new TRIPS-compliant index in Section 2.4.
2.2.1 Need for TRIPS index
Most of the available IPR indexes are not TRIPS specific and thus fall short of my expectation
to properly examine the effect of the Agreement’s implementation on economic activities. The
following paragraphs elaborate the reasons why.
TRIPS identifies seven categories of IPR and outlines the respective scopes and depths of
protection, while the available indexes mainly focus on patent protection. If the purpose of a
study is to examine the impact of IPR protection on pharmaceutical research and development
(R&D), or on licensing of patented products of process, then using a TRIPS updated patent
index is sufficient. However, solely focusing on patent protection ignores other IPR categories
that could influence innovative activities in various sectors of the economy. For example, in most
developing countries computer software is protected as literary works under copyright of TRIPS
and not necessarily under patent, while circuit board is covered by layout designs of integrated
circuits. In some countries, computer software and/or layout designs of integrated circuits may
be patentable.
Furthermore, the services sector produces intellectual creations that usually fall outside the
scope of patentability. A case in point, trademark and geographical indication protect the brand
of the goods produced while copyrights protects expressions of ideas. In addition, protection
of trade secrets as an IPR may be a significant factor in explaining certain types of economic
activities, in concordance with the results from the famous Yale survey (Cohen et al., 2000).
Therefore current emphasis on capturing patent strength relevant for activities of patent-specific
industries such as pharmaceutical and chemical industries are at the expense of industries that
do not rely on patent for protection of their intellectual property, limiting the scope of research
to patentable economic activities.
The implementation of the seven IPR categories identified by TRIPS is usually staggered
across different years. Use of the transition periods, legislative procedures, budget, expertise and
10 Quantifying TRIPS
other constraints influence the implementation times of any one of the IPR types. Thus, indexes
that attempt to capture TRIPS implementation effort by using WTO membership as proxy,
disregarding the transition periods given to developing countries, would incorrectly identify
the date when the Agreement takes full effect. This is similarly applicable to indexes that do
take into consideration the transition periods accorded by the TRIPS agreement as they may
overestimate the implementation efforts of the countries if they use the transition deadline dates
rather than examining the national legislations themselves. Case in point, countries in this
study are WTO members since 1995 and yet most of them only begin to fully comply with their
TRIPS provisions from the year 2000 onwards.2 However, there are some countries that are not
fully compliant with their obligations, missing the year 2000 mark. Jamaica is a prime example
of member countries that has not managed to reach full TRIPS compliance by the deadline
imposed.
No international IPR agreement is as enforceable as the TRIPS agreement. The Paris and
Berne Conventions set the standards for IPR protection worldwide. However they are considered
weak because of the lack of proper enforcement of these agreements at the international level.
Members of the TRIPS agreement, on the other hand, have recourse to the WTO’s effective
dispute settlement proceedings, thus allowing any one member to ensure that another member
is fully compliant with its TRIPS obligations. In the dispute case India—Mailbox, the United
States complained that India had not established the mailbox filing system from the 1st January
1996, inconsistent with its obligations under Art. 70.8 and 70.9 of the TRIPS agreement (WTO,
1997).3 The appellate body found in favor of the United States and required India to enact the
mailbox filing system retroactively. Therefore, IPR indexes that use membership to pre-TRIPS
international IPR agreements as proxy IPR systems should be used with caution; particularly
because the implementation and the enforceability of the international IPR agreements may
differ significantly from country to country. Section 2.3 elaborates on this further.
Diverse coverage of IPR categories, bindingness of the Agreement and staggered implemen-
tation dates of the TRIPS agreement by developing countries allow for a natural experiment,
investigating how this global minimum IPR standard may affect economic activities in these
countries. Thus, a new TRIPS-specific index is required to properly study whether this inter-
2The year 2000 is the TRIPS implementation deadline established by the Agreement for most developing
countries.
3Under the mailbox system, a mechanism is set up to allow for the filing of patent applications of pharmaceutical
or agrochemical products. The patent application would be reviewed from the date on which patenting in the
field of pharmaceutical and agrochemical products are allowed. Once an application is subject to the mailbox
application and it has obtained marketing approval then that product will be granted exclusive marketing rights
(EMR) for five years, a right that is similar to patent protection (Watal, 2001).
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national agreement affects local economic activities in developing countries.
2.2.2 Available IPR indexes
Most available IPR indexes are built through a set of criteria that establishes an ideal or adequate
IPR legal system. Based on how these criteria are satisfied, I classify the indexes according to
three types: legislation- and survey-based approaches, and combination of the two. When the
criteria are satisfied via examination of the country’s rules and regulations, I refer to them as
legislation-based, while those that require the responses of experts are categorized as survey-
based. Each of these approaches, on its own, has its weaknesses. The legislation-based approach
is criticized for overestimating the level of protection accorded because it does not take into
consideration the actual enforcement of those rights.4 On the other hand, the survey-based
approach can be subjective, relying on the way the questions are posed and possibly reflecting
some “ideological tendencies” as mentioned by Kauffman et al. (2004). Using a combination
of the two approaches of building an index through examination of countries’ IPR legislations
and interacting with expert assessment of actual enforcement of the IPR law would rectify the
weaknesses in either one of the approaches, legislation- and survey-based.
Gadbaw and Richards (1988) constructs the first legislation-based patent index, which is
extended by Rapp and Rozek (1990). This type of index construction notes whether a country’s
IPR legislation is in conformity with the minimum standards of IPR as proposed by the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce Intellectual Property Task Force (1987), ranging from 0 (absence of
IPR protection) to 5 (full compliance with the minimum standards). Rather than focusing on
national legislations, Ferrantino (1993) builds an index using membership in World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) basic conventions as an input measure of IPR strength for
75 countries. Later, Ginarte and Park (1997) produces the most widely used IPR-index to
date, basing their index on collection of both national patent legislations and membership to
international IPR conventions. The index covers large number of countries over the period 1960
— 1990 and allows for variations in cross-country patent laws, making it desirable for cross-
country studies (Maskus, 2000). Criteria to measure the strength of a country’s patent regime
are: (i) membership in international treaties, (ii) extent of patent coverage, (iii) restrictions on
patent rights, (iv) enforcement and (v) duration of the patent protection. In 2008, Park (2008)
updates the Ginarte-Park index to include TRIPS membership and extends its country and
4I use the term “actual enforcement” to refer to the country’s practice of protecting their IPR rules. For
example, a country may have strong IPR legislation but lack the budget or political will to ensure that its IPR is
fully protected. Here, I refer to means that the government can fully enforce, e.g. custom control of pirated goods.
Other means of enforcement, such as the injured party taking the possible violator to court is not considered here;
this is a case between private parties and thus outside government control.
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year coverage. Lastly, Park and Lippoldt (2007) uses two indexes, in addition to the patent
index by Park (2008), on copyright and trademark to investigate the economic impact of these
IPR types. These two IPR categories of copyright and trademark follow similar set of rules as
those set in Ginarte and Park (1997) such that they cover issues related to coverage, usage,
enforcement and membership to international IPR treaties but are specific to copyrights and
trademark respectively.
Lee and Mansfield (1996) conducts the first survey-based IPR index. The survey asks 100
major U.S. multinational firms how a country’s IPR regime affects its investment strategy in
the host country, i.e. transfer of technology to wholly owned subsidiaries, investment in joint
ventures with local partners or licensing of technology, and averages the responses for 14 devel-
oping countries. Seyoum (1996) builds a similar survey-based index but bases his questionnaire
on the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (1987) guidelines, and later sends them to IPR experts or
practitioners in 27 countries. These indexes were oftentimes for a specific and limited time pe-
riod, making it difficult to asses the dynamic impact of IPR protection. The ongoing surveys
on the strength of IPR across different countries by the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the
IMD correct this time limitation problem. The WEF questionnaire asks market participants of
both developing and developed countries a question on the strength of IPR protection in their
respective countries. It queries, “Intellectual property protection in your country is: (1=weak
or non-existent, 7=equal to the world’s most stringent)” to professionals residing in those coun-
tries. The result of the survey is published in their annual Global Competitiveness Report. The
IMD questionnaire, on the other hand, inquires whether IPR “are adequately enforced” to senior
business leaders in those respective countries, ranging from 1 to 10 with 10 being the highest
achievable score.5 These survey-based indexes capture the perceived IPR strengths of countries
but are highly subjective to the questions posed and the experts selected.
The problems associated with the legislation- and survey-based indexes may be addressed
by using the two approaches together, as Kondo (1995), Sherwood (1997), Ostergard (2000) and
Javorcik (2004) have done. Kondo builds his index on a similar criteria as Ginarte and Park
(1997) but weights each subcomponent of the patent regime using results from market practi-
tioners’ input on the enforcement level. Sherwood (1997) probably offers the most extensive
coverage in determining the strength of nations’ IPR regime by examining issues of copyright,
patents, trademarks, trade secrets, life forms in addition to enforceability, administration, public
commitment and international treaties signed of the IPR regime. However, his IPR index only
covers 18 developing countries and the weights assigned to the components of IPR regime are
5A simple Pearson pairwise correlation shows that the IMD and WEF survey results are strongly correlated.
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based primarily on his personal knowledge and personal interviews with professionals from those
countries. Ostergard (2000) examines the legislations of patent, copyright and trademark laws
using the US Chamber of Commerce’s guidelines and supplements this legislative information
with enforcement assessment from the US State Department’s Country Reports on Economic
and Trade Practices. Javorcik (2004) builds on the Ginarte and Park (1997) index but adds
the element of enforcement by accounting for countries that have been flagged by the United
States’ Special 301 as countries that have weak IPR regimes. Lastly, Lesser (2002) constructs
an index using secondary data to build a TRIPS compliant patent-specific index, and adds an
actual enforcement component captured by the Transparency International’s Corruption Per-
ception Index (CPI). He then runs factor analysis to determine the importance of each criterion
and weighs each of them in his construction of the IPR index by the aggregate factor values. He
further cross-references the criterion with responses from a survey sent to patent attorneys and
licensing executives of agricultural and pharmaceutical firms in the United States and Europe.
Table 2.1 on page 15 summarizes the three approaches to constructing IPR indexes. It high-
lights the different IPR categories captured by the indexes, the international agreements under
consideration, whether the indexes have an actual enforcement component, country and years
coverage, update frequency and the index sources. The legislation type indexes, Park (2008)
and Park and Lippoldt (2007), are mainly built on the countries’ IPR rules and regulations.6
The survey type indexes, Lee and Mansfield (1996) and Seyoum (1996), emphasize the expert
opinions over the countries’ legislations. And lastly, the indexes that include both legislation-
and survey-approaches, Ostergard (2000) and Lesser (2002) utilize both the countries’ legisla-
tions and actual enforcement to construct indexes that capture both the legal rules and the
enforcement of those rules.
The table shows how the IPR indexes available today fall short of capturing IPR legislative
changes due to the TRIPS agreement. The indexes here neither cover all seven IPR categories
nor the different time periods of implementation for each of the IPR types. Park and Lippoldt
(2007) and Lesser (2002) come close to capturing TRIPS elements in their indexes. However Park
and Lippoldt (2007) falls short of being TRIPS-compliant mainly because it covers three of the
seven IPR categories set by TRIPS and double-counts the importance of international treaties.
The TRIPS agreement references both the Paris and Berne convention and incorporates main
elements of those treaties. Therefore tracking a country’s membership of both the Paris and
Berne convention in addition to the TRIPS agreement is redundant. Lesser (2002) on the other
6Park and Lippoldt (2007) includes an actual enforcement component,however this enforcement component is
used as a separate explanatory variable from the IPR indexes.Thus, I consider the indexes discussed in this paper
as only legislation-based.
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hand, focuses solely on the implementation of patents at the expense of other IPR categories for
the year 1998, making it difficult to study the dynamic impact of this Agreement. Aside from
the coverage of IPR categories, the time period coverage in the cases of Park (2008) and Park
and Lippoldt (2007) are relatively comprehensive. However their data is updated every 5 years,
disregarding the possibility that most of the legislative changes may occur within those years,
especially within the years 1995 – 2000.
Other attempts at capturing TRIPS are undertaken by Musungu and Oh (2006), and Thorpe
(2002). Both papers aim to study the use of TRIPS flexibility by developing country members.
Musungu and Oh (2006)’s paper focuses on the public health issue and thus considers patent-
related information only. Thorpe (2002)’s research is more exhaustive in that he surveys different
countries in different regions and analyzes the patent, copyright and related rights, and undis-
closed information. Unfortunately these study papers only examine the current legislations in
force, not distinguishing between legislations that are TRIPS-compliant and those that are not,
exclude the exact date of TRIPS-compliant legislations implementation, and omit other TRIPS
relevant IPR categories in their studies.
A useful TRIPS index should capture the seven IPR categories as the Agreement states and
note the different implementation time periods per IPR category over several years, to allow for
a dynamic assessment of the Agreement’s influence. In Section 2.4.1 I build a TRIPS-specific
IPR index that attempts to address these concerns. But prior to building the index I detail how
TRIPS differs from previous international IPR agreements to emphasize how TRIPS changes
the global IPR landscape in the following section.
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2.3 Change in global IPR landscape
TRIPS agreement changes the global IPR landscape, harmonizing and setting the minimum
level of protection for intangible goods and services. It identifies seven IPR categories: (i) copy-
rights and related rights, (ii) trademark; (iii) geographical indications; (iv) industrial designs,
(v) layout designs of integrated circuits, (vi) patents, and (vii) undisclosed information, above
and beyond the pre-TRIPS international IPR conventions. For each of these categories, the
WTO principles of most-favored nation (MFN) and national treatment basis are applicable,
unlike when reciprocity was a principle for extending IPR protection to foreigners.13 TRIPS’
enforceability at the multilateral level due to the effective dispute settlement mechanism of the
WTO presents a credible threat for countries to comply with the obligations (Watal, 2001; Ger-
vais, 2003). Therefore, the harmonized scope of IPR protection and its enforceability would lead
toward convergence of IPR regimes across developing countries. Furthermore, this convergence
should be relatively independent of the respective countries’ economic development because of
the implementation deadlines imposed.
2.3.1 Pre-TRIPS
National IPR landscape prior to the TRIPS agreement seemed more flexible, with countries
implementing the IPR provisions when it was in their national interest. Prior to the TRIPS,
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan had enforced “soft” IPR regimes, enabling
themselves to adopt, adapt and assimilate technologies from developed nations (Kumar, 2002).
Some of the other developing countries were more inclined to copy the IPR systems of their
former colonial rulers than build a system suitable for their economic conditions. For example,
South Africa, Kenya, Zambia, Namibia, Swaziland and Morocco had a few TRIPS compliant
legislations before the WTO agreement was signed in 1995. However, enforcement of these IPR
legislations were oftentimes weak because of limited resources and/or lack of political will. As
a consequence there was a noticeable and significant relationship between the extent of IPR
protection and level of economic development, whereby higher income countries provided more
IPR protection than lower income countries (Evenson and Westphal, 1997). The World Bank
(2001) report concurs with (Evenson and Westphal, 1997) and adds that IPR regimes also tend
to be stronger when the country has high innovation capacities.14
13MFN and national treatment are principles of the WTO trading system. Simply put, MFN rule obliges each
member country to treat every one of its trading partner as its closest partner, while national treatment policy
requires that every foreign trader should be treated like a local one.
14The term “innovation capacities” refers to the country’s ability to produce innovation, usually proxied by the
proportion of R&D per domestic production, ratio of science and engineers of the country’s labor population, and
so on.
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Patent protection is an area of IPR where the international agreement governing industrial
policy, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, (Paris Convention) ac-
cords considerable policy room for developing countries to apply the rules according to their
country’s level of economic development, or to meet specific industrial policy. India used to
protect process and not product patenting of pharmaceutical products, thus creating a legal
condition for local pharmaceutical companies to produce generic versions of branded drugs.
Surveying the IPR regimes in a selected number of countries, a WIPO submitted document to
the WTO show that only three of the 42 developing countries studied had patent protection
for the duration of 20 years, notably South Africa, Zimbabwe and Nigeria (WIPO, 1988). In
addition, exclusion of patent protection in areas such as life forms, pharmaceutical and agricul-
ture chemical products, and computer programs were norm, as they depended on each country’s
perception of patentability. TRIPS agreement has broadened the scope of protection conferred
to patented inventions by: (i) protecting process and products; (ii) applying this to all techno-
logical fields; and (iii) setting a minimum duration of patent protection. However, strengthening
patent protection is not the only change that TRIPS has imposed on developing countries.
2.3.2 Modification in IPR protection
Main multilateral IPR agreements and the practices during the negotiations of the Uruguay
Round shaped the language and rights of members of the TRIPS agreement. These agreements
were the Paris Convention governing industrial property and trademark, Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention)and Rome Convention
for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations
(Rome Convention) on copyrights and related rights. A then-recent international agreement
on integrated circuits, the Washington Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated
Circuit (Washington Treaty or the IPIC treaty), is also included in the text of the Agreement.
TRIPS merges the scope and breath of protection outlined in these agreements as well as the
practices related to the implementation of these conventions and formalizes them under one
umbrella. Thus obligating members of the WTO to comply with relevant provisions of these
agreements, even if they were not formerly signatories to the agreements aforementioned. The
new obligations imposed by TRIPS narrows the policy room for many developing countries to
tailor their IPR systems according to their development needs.
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Patents
Paris Convention extends patent protection to both product and process in all fields of technol-
ogy. Furthermore, it allows member countries to determine their own standards of protection in
regards to duration of protection, patentable subject matters and exceptions to patent rights as
long as the principles of national treatment is consistently applied. TRIPS incorporates the sub-
stantive elements of Paris Convention on patent protection but curtails the flexibility accorded.
All WTO members have to ensure that the duration of patent protection is set at 20 years
from date of patent application filing, instances in which suspension of the protection could be
invoked are limited, exceptions to subject matters excludable from patenting are clearly defined,
and patentees rights are extended to include associated rights of offering for sale or importing.
In general TRIPS’ provision on patent protection is applicable to both product and process
inventions for all technological fields except for certain subject matters that are considered pub-
lic goods, biologically occurring products and processes of plants or animals, and any methods
for treatment of human or animals. Plant varieties are protected either under patent or by an
effective sui generis legislation. A transition period of five years from the date of TRIPS enforce-
ment deadline, 1st January 2000, is given to developing countries that have not provided patent
protection in any area of technology prior to the general enforcement date of the Agreement, 1st
January 1996.15 Specifically, developing countries that have not provided protection for phar-
maceutical and/or agricultural chemical products prior to 1st January 1995 are required to set
up a mailbox system of patent application and provide exclusive marketing rights (EMR) from
the 1st January 1996 (TRIPS Art. 70.8).16 Failure to comply with this provision implies non-
compliance with the agreement even when developing countries are accorded transition periods
to phase in the TRIPS-compliant IPR regime (see WTO (1997)’s India—Mailbox dispute).
Undisclosed information
Undisclosed information was not formally considered a category of IPR protection until the
TRIPS agreement.17 It was oftentimes protected by general civil law or tort, contract and/or
criminal laws. At the international level reference to its protection was mandated by Art. 10bis
of the Paris Convention particularly vis-a`-vis unfair competition, whereby the information is
15For LDCs this implementation period is extended to 1st January 2016 because of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration.
16Under the mailbox filing system rule, WTO members that did not allow for patenting of pharmaceutical
and/or agricultural chemical products previously had to establish a filing system for these products.
17Also referred to as “trade secrets”, “confidential information” and the like in many national laws. The term
“undisclosed information” was purposely chosen by negotiating parties of the Uruguay Round to avoid referring
to specific expressions of any legal system (Gervais, 2003).
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safeguarded from misappropriation in an unauthorized manner. During negotiations, developing
countries did not recognize undisclosed information as an IPR category and were against its
inclusion. They argued that extending protection to this subject matter would push their
obligations beyond patent protection because of the limitless term of protection accorded to this
category and the absence of disclosure tradeoff for protection, unlike patents (Watal, 2001); but
it was included nevertheless. TRIPS underscores the importance of undisclosed protection by
setting it as an IPR category and extending it to include data submitted to governments for
marketing approval of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products.
There are two parts to protecting undisclosed information under the agreement: the gen-
eral need to protect information that is secret and valuable, also known as trade secrets, and
the requirement to protect information disclosed for marketing approval from the government.
Trade secrets is defined as information which was generated from a specific investment, consid-
ered valuable, known to few people in the industry, and where effort has been undertaken to
maintain its secrecy. As for data submitted to governments for marketing approval, the data
has to be undisclosed, the product tested to generate the data uses “new chemical entities”, and
“considerable effort” has to be spent to produce the data. These information are protected for
as long as they are not revealed by the owner or an independent third party.
The implementation of TRIPS Art. 39.2 on trade secrets is likely to be straightforward, since
many have already provided protection for this category. But the differing interpretations and
implementations of Art. 39.3 on data submitted to governments and their respective agencies
could lead to varying treatments of protection of data submitted for marketing approval across
WTO members. Firstly, it is unclear if protection under this IPR category requires “exclusive
rights” protection. If the protection mandates exclusive rights protection, then the common
practice in developing countries of allowing for the sufficiency of establishing bioequivalence for
generic drugs with the original test data would no longer be acceptable for a given time period.
Secondly, the ordinary reading of Art. 39.3 could be interpreted as mandating protection only
to “new chemical entity” implying that new uses of existing chemical product would not be
covered, which can be controversial for some other member countries such as the United States
(Correa, 2002).
Copyrights and related rights
The Berne Convention was the highest protection afforded at the international level for copy-
rights before TRIPS. It mandates that all literary and artistic works that meet the originality
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and intellectual creation criteria should be protected automatically from the date of creation
without subject to any formalities for the duration of the author’s lifespan plus 50 years. A
separate duration of at least 25 years is extended to works of applied arts and industrial de-
sign, although members are allowed to determine the extent of application and conditions of
this protection. Brazil, for example, protected computer programs as works of applied arts and
thus administered the 25 year protection. More importantly the Berne Convention allows for
broader scope of exceptions to copyright protection and provides flexible implementation obli-
gations to developing countries. A predominant exception practiced by many countries is the
fair use doctrine where use of the copyrighted material is sanctioned in instances of private, not
for profit and educational purposes, i.e. uses that generate positive spillover (Blair and Cotter,
2005). The appendix to the Berne Convention outlines special provisions applicable to develop-
ing countries. For example, translation of copyrighted materials into the national language is
allowed if it meets the 3-step criteria for limited uses of exceptions to copyright.18
Related rights, also known as neighboring rights, is mainly governed by the Rome Con-
vention. It obliges protection of performers, producers of sound recordings and broadcasting
organization for 20 years from the date of performance, broadcast or fixation without subject
to any formalities. Protection includes the right to control the reproduction of their work. The
Convention, however, did not offer any enforcement provision in case of infringement but most
countries offered civil remedies.
TRIPS combines the rights of copyrights and related rights under one heading, merging
relevant elements of the Berne and Rome Conventions. However, the marginal addition and legal
clarifications of TRIPS provisions on copyrights and related rights, as well as the compliance of
many developing countries with the pre-existing international laws on this subject matter made
this the least controversial IPR category of TRIPS. Nevertheless, there were some opposition
from developing countries in regards to the obligations under rental rights (Art. 11) and related
rights (Art. 14). Art. 11 of TRIPS introduces rental rights protection for computer programs
and sound recordings, which most developing country negotiators considered as a Berne-plus
obligation. Furthermore, Watal (2001) argues that Art. 14 of TRIPS on related rights creates
new obligations that are higher than those mandated by Rome Convention but points out that
this was not met with much resistance from several of them as they were already providing such
protection.
18The 3-step test used to establish if the instance to avail to copyright exception is: (i) granted in special
cases only; (ii) not conflict with normal exploitation of work; and (iii) not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the author.
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Layout designs of integrated circuits
Protection of layout designs of integrated circuits is a relatively new addition to the global IPR
system. The upsurge in United States’ semiconductor companies and export to other countries
gave rise to this protection. At the time of Uruguay Round of negotiations, the Washington
Treaty governed the protection of this IPR category at the global level. However lack of adequate
number of ratification by members of this treaty ensured that the treaty did not come into
force.19 TRIPS remedies this situation by enforcing it as part of the IPR package. In addition,
the Agreement expands the scope of protection to include protected designs and set the term of
protection for a minimum of 8 years from filing date or date of first commercial exploitation.
Layout designs of integrated circuits protects the configuration of a circuit board, whereby
changes made to the board increases its functionality. These changes oftentimes require high
degree of skills and large amount R&D, thus qualifying it for patent protection in some juris-
dictions.
Industrial designs
Industrial designs protection has been protected under the Paris Convention and is included as an
IPR category. Prior to TRIPS, countries were able to protect industrial designs with copyright
laws, unfair competition or by establishing sui generis legislation on the matter. Protection
in this area is in regards to the aesthetic, and sometimes functional, aspects of any product
that is industrially produced. It can also be protected under copyright laws, thus obtaining
concurrent and simultaneous protection. However unlike copyright, protection under industrial
designs safeguards from independent development of similar design.
TRIPS did not create additional obligations under industrial design protection. It merely
reinforces the common practices and rules of Paris Convention, whereby the term of protection
is for least 10 years.
Trademark and GI
Trademark and geographical indication (GI) protect consumers from being misinformed about
the products that they are purchasing due to false advertisements or similar appearances. Trade-
mark has been protected under Paris Convention but is only extended to goods and not services.
TRIPS marginally increases the protection level of trademark in both developed and developing
19Developing countries were actively participating in the negotiations of this treaty, and thus reflected many
of its views. However, the United States and Japan did not sign onto the treaty as it was perceived as providing
inadequate protection level (Gervais, 2003; Watal, 2001).
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countries. It clearly defines trademark, outlines the treatment of well-known foreign marks, and
provides limited protection for services trademark (Watal, 2001).
GI was protected under Madrid System for the International Registration of Marks20 and
Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International Registra-
tion21 in regards to appellations of origin. Prior to TRIPS, GI was provided by a few countries
and there was diversity in the protection methods and standards. TRIPS included GI as one
of the IPR categories but left implementation of this particular area to members, with a caveat
that members will continue their negotiations in this matter to define its scope and depth of
protection.
The last table in the appendix of this chapter summarizes the seven IPR categories mentioned
above. It shows the definition, term of protection, criteria for protection, rights conferred and
the exceptions for each of the IPR types. In the following section I build the TRIPS index base
on the definition and the term of protection of the IPR categories.
2.4 TRIPS index: method
TRIPS agreement is broken into eight parts. Part I upholds the basic tenets of the WTO, while
Part II highlights the minimum substantive protection in the different IPR categories. Parts
III and IV outline the various process procedures to be implemented or modified. Part V man-
dates publications of new or modified legislations and that disputes would be conducted under
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) agreement. Part V I sets the transitional
arrangements for developing countries. And finally Part V III describes institutional arrange-
ments and other final details of the agreement. All of these TRIPS provisions are equally binding
but the relevant provisions that pertain to IPR scope and depth of protection are contained in
parts II and III.22
I select my sample of developing countries by considering all 76 countries that joined the
WTO on the 1st January 1995 but dropping those that the World Bank classifies as high income
countries23. I omit two of the 44 developing countries remaining due to the difficulty of obtaining
their IPR legislations online. For personal interest and to add diversity to the sample purposes, I
20Hereinafter referred to as the Madrid Treaty.
21Hereinafter referred to as the Lisbon Treaty.
22Every part of this Agreement is technically equally binding. Thus, there is no hierarchy between enforcing
either Trademark and Undisclosed Information rights. This is referred to as the principle of effective interpretation.
(See Appellate Body Report, WTO (1999).
23These countries include those that are members of the OECD and those that are considered non-OECD.
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include 11 developing countries that join the WTO in the year 1995 other than the 1st January,24
and three high income countries from the Southeast Asia region.
2.4.1 Data collection
I focus on the substantive elements of the Agreement to capture institutional changes that would
affect innovative activities and simplify data collection effort. Procedural and administrative
aspects of TRIPS is likely to affect the behaviors of IPR users in regards to time for filing
or challenges to patent, trademark or copyright grants. But they are less likely to affect the
undertaking of innovative activities and thus are not included in the construction of the TRIPS
index. I note that a country is in compliance with the Agreement when the term of protection
for each of the IPR category reflects those mandated by TRIPS. Sub-section 2.4.2 describes in
detail how the index was constructed.
Data collection of each of the 53 developing member countries are based on careful examina-
tion of primary and secondary sources and in consultation with IPR experts, wherever possible.
Following Lesser (2002), I scour the WTO official documents, which reviews members’ efforts in
implementing TRIPS provisions25 and cross-reference them to the WTO Secretariat documents
on these members’ overall trade policies. These documents, referred to as the TRIPS Council
Legislation Review and Trade Policy Review reports, are reliable sources for members’ legislative
changes as they are based on the governments’ own submissions and the Secretariat’s objective
research.26 I note compliance of each IPR category base on whether the legislation in the reports
meet the TRIPS mandated minimum term of protection; a method similar to Rapp and Rozek
(1990). When the minimum term of protection is in concordance with the Agreement, I save the
name of the legislation and consult WIPO’s Collection of Laws for Electronic Access (CLEA)
database for the year that the legislation is implemented.27
I collect both the implementation and the in force dates of the TRIPS specific IPR categories
national legislations. For my thesis purposes, the implementation date of the national legislations
is more important than the in force as this is when I assume people should be aware of the new
or modified legislation.28 In most cases, implementation and in force dates are within the same
24These countries acceded to the WTO over the course of 1995, and thus are able to use the transition period
for implementation according to their income levels.
25This includes the question and answer portion of the TRIPS Review Mechanism.
26These documents can be retrieved from the WTO site by searching for documents “IP/Q*” and “WTO/TPR”
respectively.
27There are two dates that corresponds to legislation - the implementation and in force date. The implementa-
tion date is usually the date wherein which the legislation is signed and approved, while the in force date refers
to when the legislation comes into force.
28I assume that all agents would make their decisions on all information available to them during that period.
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year except for low income and a few other countries.
In creating the index I make three assumptions. First, I assume that a year prior to the
WTO inception, 1994, members in the sample were not TRIPS-compliant. Second, I assume
that members would use the transition period afforded by the TRIPS agreement in implementing
their IPR obligations.29 And lastly, I assume that members are not able to implement all
seven IPR categories simultaneously because of various constraints, e.g. budget. Given these
assumptions, I build an index that takes into consideration all seven IPR categories and the
different implementation times for each of those categories for the years 1994 onward.
2.4.2 Creating the index
Copyright, trademark, geographical indication, industrial designs, patents, layout designs of
integrated circuits and undisclosed information are the seven categories of IPR identified by
TRIPS. I create dummy variables to reflect members’ compliance with the respective terms
of duration per category. I assign 1 to the category, and 0 otherwise, if the IPR legislation
mandates the protection term that is in-line with the Agreement. I create three subsections
for under the headings of patent and copyright and related rights, and two subsections for the
undisclosed information because of the additional demands imposed by the Agreement on these
IPR categories.
The three subsections under the patent heading accommodates the obligation to provide
20 years term of patent protection, including extension of the patent protection to pharmaceu-
tical and agricultural chemical products, and the sui generis plant varieties legislation. Data
collection of dates for implementation of these three patent subsections show time implementa-
tion discrepancies. In comparison to the 36 member countries who currently offer the 20-year
patent protection term, 12 members have different date of implementation for pharmaceutical
and agricultural chemical products, while for plant varieties there are 26 members.
Copyright and related rights category in TRIPS refers to the copyright law as protected un-
der Berne Convention and related rights, which falls under Rome Convention. Given that most
countries were complying with the main Berne Convention provisions, I note TRIPS compliance
when the country meets the additional obligations imposed by the Agreement. These additional
And thus, even if a legislation may not be in force, the important fact is that the agent expects the legislation to
be in force within a specific time period and thus will base her future actions on the information she has today.
29An additional time period of four years is accorded to countries considered as developing, and ten years for
least-developed countries from the 1st January 1996. The WTO follows the United Nation’s categorization of
least-developed countries (LDCs). However, the status of developing country is based on self-selection. The Doha
Ministerial Conference allowed LDCs a further extension until 1st July 2013 to ensure that complete TRIPS-
compliance.
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obligations that are not specifically covered in the Berne Convention are the treatment of com-
puter programs as literary works, inclusion of rental rights and related rights. These add-ons
raise the level of protection on copyrights and related rights and are important from economic
perspectives. Firstly, protecting computer program as literary work entails longer term of pro-
tection. Secondly, rental rights obligations on computer programs and cinematographic work
are important in countries where rampant pirating of these works render the copyright protec-
tion useless (Watal, 2001). And lastly, protection of performers, producers of phonogram and
broadcasting organizations rights ensure adequate legal protection for these entities. Therefore,
I count these add-ons as my three subsections towards compliance under the copyright and
related rights category. Six and seven countries of those that implemented the treatment of
computer programs as literary works have different implementation dates of rental rights and
related rights respectively, confirming that these add-ons should be considered separately.
I also treat undisclosed information differently from the rest of the IPR categories. Undis-
closed information is broken down into two subsections because of the protection afforded by
TRIPS under this heading. It is defined by TRIPS as information kept secret plus data sub-
mitted to governments and their respective agencies for marketing approval. Comparison of
undisclosed information protection across countries shows differing approaches to the protection
of data submitted to governments for marketing approval. There has not been any expressed
protection of data submitted for marketing approval for most of the developing countries here.
Those countries that did provide for this particular protection allow the use of this data to
establish bioequivalence of a similar product.30 The results show that some 14 odd-countries
out of 37 member countries that do provide TRIPS-compliant trade secret compliance have not
implement data submitted for marketing approval protection until later.
Noting compliance of the remaining IPR categories, trademark, layout designs of integrated
circuits, industrial design and geographical indication are more straightforward than for copy-
rights and related rights, patents and undisclosed information. I consider the remaining cate-
gories as TRIPS-compliant when the term of protection for the category as listed by the Agree-
ment is implemented in the national legislations. As such, compliance occurs only when (i) the
IPR category is as defined by TRIPS is protected for the (ii) minimum term of protection.
Table 2.2 summarizes how a country’s IPR legislations sum towards its TRIPS-compliance
index number. Each of the seven IPR categories enter the index unweighted, reflecting the
30Interestingly, protection of data submitted for marketing approval of pharmaceutical or agricultural chemicals
was an attempt by the United States negotiators to curb the use of data collected by its pharmaceutical and
chemical industries by generic producers and other competitors.
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IPR Category Total
Copyright and related rights 1
Computer program 13
Rental rights 13
Related rights 13
Trademark 1
Geographical indications 1
Industrial designs 1
Patents 1
Patents 13
Pharmaceutical patents 13
Plant varieties 13
Layout designs of integrated circuits 1
Undisclosed information 1
Trade secrets 12
Data submission 12
Total 7
Table 2.2: TRIPS index method
equal importance of each provisions considered under international law and practice.31 This
index ranges from 0 to 7, from non-compliance to full TRIPS compliance. Full compliance, or an
index total of 7, implies that the country has legally met all of the substantial TRIPS obligations,
while 0 connotes that the particular country has not yet undertaken any efforts to comply with
the Agreement. The index thus allows for examination of the TRIPS implementations across
many developing countries over the time studied (1994 — 2007), and to observe any impact of
this obligation on the countries’ economic activities.
2.4.3 Some issues
This TRIPS index has several drawbacks that should be taken into consideration when using for
economic analysis. These shortcomings are attributable to the assumptions I make and method
I use in building this legislative-type index.
Firstly, as in the legislation-type approach of building indexes, I construct the index using bi-
nary numbers to represent whether a developing country has satisfied a particular IPR category,
depending on the TRIPS’ minimum term of protection for the category defined. This method
is likely to underestimate the extent of a country’s compliance with a specific category if one of
the two criteria is not satisfied. For example, I would consider a country’s trademark legislation
as not TRIPS-compliant if the country allows for trademark of goods but not services, even if
31See footnote 22.
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the country could be mostly compliant with its trademark legislation. It has been proposed that
further granularity per IPR category should be introduced, as I have done for copyright and
related rights, patents and undisclosed information. However, I introduce granularities for these
IPR categories and not the remaining ones because the Agreement imposes additional demands
on these categories.
Secondly, every one of the seven IPR categories enter the TRIPS index unweighted, meaning
that each category has equal importance for this index. Legal interpretation requires that each
IPR category listed in the Agreement are treated equally, that there is no hierarchy in the
implementation of the TRIPS provisions. However, economic rationale argues that protection
of trademark may not be as important or significant as protection of patented innovation, or
vice-versa. However attaching weights to any one of the category could be subjective, like the
index created by Sherwood (1997). A possible option to get around this subjectivity is to interact
each component of the TRIPS index with variables that correspond to economic activities in
the countries. For example, we could weight the services-related IPR categories of a country by
the proportion of the country’s economy attributable to services sector and so on.
In addition, each incremental increase of the index mirrors the country’s implementation
effort with any one of the seven IPR categories, in no particular order. Therefore, the index
may not reflect the strength of the country’s IPR regime, making it difficult to argue that a
country with TRIPS index of 3 is significantly different from another with an index of 4. We
could address this flaw by subdividing the index into three categories of high-, middle- and
low-compliance levels. Countries with a TRIPS index of above 5 can be deemed high-, between
2.1 and 4.9 as middle-, and below 2 as low-levels of compliance.
Another problem associated with the unweighting of the TRIPS index is that we do not know
which IPR category is being implemented at different time periods. For example, a country may
achieve a TRIPS index of 5, implying high TRIPS compliance, but may neglect to fully comply
with its obligations for patent protection. In this case, access to the disaggregated TRIPS index
would be rectify the problem.
Thirdly, this index considers memberships to other IPR international agreement as irrelevant.
It can be contended that membership to those agreements, such as Paris Convention, reflects the
country’s willingness to abide by certain agreed rules and regulations and thus should be taken
into consideration. I argue that if membership to those agreements were sufficient, then the need
to have another international agreement on IPR, such as TRIPS, would be redundant. Recall
from Section 2.2 that the TRIPS agreement can be better enforced than older international IPR
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agreements, thus making this Agreement “stronger” than its predecessors. In addition, TRIPS
adopts the main elements of some of the more important IPR agreements, such as Paris and
Berne, and thus including membership to the said agreements would be double-counting.
Lastly, as legislation-type indexes discussed earlier, this index considers TRIPS-compliant
rules and regulations without looking at the enforcement aspect. Enforcement of the IPR legis-
lation at the national level is dependent on (i) government’s willingness to enforce the legislation
and (ii) the ability of IPR holders, as well as challengers to the IPR granted, to have recourse
to the judicial system, which may include but are not limited to, opposition of patent grant
procedures, legal fees, and the transparency of IPR system, assuming the competence of the
local judicial system in dealing with IPR issues. Furthermore, unlike the indexes built by Park
(Park (2008) and Park and Lippoldt (2007)), I do not include the specificities of local legal
administrative enforcement, such as existence of burden-of-proof reversal in the case of patent
system. However, the Agreement sets the administrative enforcement standards for member
countries and failure to comply with these standards can lead to dispute settlement proceeding.
This allows for the assumption that when a developing country member complies with any of the
IPR categories, it also complies with the administrative aspect of that category. Furthermore,
we can overcome the lack of these enforcement-specific factors by interacting the TRIPS index
with data collected by the USTR, WEF or IMD, or any other data that captures the actual
local enforcement of the IPR system, following Lesser (2002).
Nevertheless this index still retains the important factors that sets it apart from other in-
dexes: it is TRIPS-specific, takes into consideration the transition periods accorded to developing
countries, and covers several countries over ten years of annual observation. Furthermore, the
index in its current form is adequate for the purpose of this paper.
I discuss and analyze the results of this compilation of IPR legislations of the 53 countries
in the following section.
2.5 Analysis of data collected
I examine and cross-check the IPR legislations, Trade Policy Reports and TRIPS Council Leg-
islation Review documents of 53 countries to build the index necessary for this paper.32 The
sample consists of countries from the European (7%), Asian (21%), African (32%) and Latin
American and Caribbean (40%) continents with varying income levels. Most of the countries in
32Refer to subsection 2.4 for explanation of country selection.
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the sample are upper-middle (36%), lower-middle (34%) and low income countries, while high
income countries only account for 3%. There are seven LDCs among the countries studied, all
from the African continent except for Bangladesh, in Asia. I subdivide the countries by region
and income levels to get a comprehensive picture of the efforts undertaken. The result of the
data collection effort below refer to the legislations in those countries that are in force. Approx-
imately 12 countries have TRIPS-compliant legislations that were not in force, and so I omit
them from the analysis below.
2.5.1 Graphical analysis
Three trends appear from the developing countries’ implementation of their TRIPS obligations.
Firstly, almost all countries avail themselves to the transition periods afforded by the Agreement,
and in most cases have exceed the time limit imposed by the transition period, excluding the
LDCs. Mexico, Romania, and South Africa of the developing countries and Coˆte d’Ivoire of
the LDCs are the few that have implemented the TRIPS obligations before their deadline, year
2013. The figures displayed in this subsection and on page A–40 in the appendix show to this
effect.
Secondly, implementation efforts of developing countries vary, and not necessarily because
of their income levels. Given the stylized fact that most high income countries have higher IPR
protection than lower income countries, it can be argued that countries with high income levels
should implement TRIPS relatively quickly in comparison to low income countries. However,
snapshots of TRIPS compliance efforts of developing countries for the years 1995 and 2000, Fig.
2.1 and 2.2 respectively, show evidences contrary to this. In 1995, five developing countries had
most of their IPR legislations in compliance with the TRIPS agreement, categorized by index ≥
5, (Fig. 2.1(b)). In the year 2000, the number of countries with four of the 27 developing coun-
tries highly compliant with the Agreement are low income countries (Fig. 2.2(b)). Countries to
the left of the red dotted line in Fig. 2.1(b) and 2.2(b) are low income countries. More com-
prehensively, Fig. 2.3 the income levels of developing countries studied against the years when
they became highly TRIPS-compliant (TRIPS index ≥ 5). The figure shows that most of the
developing countries achieve high TRIPS compliance in the year 2000 regardless of their income
levels. Examination of the countries’ TRIPS compliance and their innovative capacities also
show that the developing countries’ studied seem obliged to implement the TRIPS agreement
regardless of their countries’ innovative capacities. Fig. 2.4 plots countries that have achieved
high TRIPS compliance by their innovative capacities proxied by the ArCo index, computed by
Archibugi and Coco (2004). The ArCo index classifies the developing countries into four cate-
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gories: leader, potential, latecomers and marginalized, indicating the levels of these countries’
innovation capacities.
(a) All 53 countries (b) Upper-left hand corner
Figure 2.1: TRIPS compliance by wealth, 1995
(a) All 53 countries (b) Upper-left hand corner
Figure 2.2: TRIPS compliance by wealth, 2000
Analysis of the implementation efforts over the years give further support to the fact that
implementation of TRIPS agreement is not entirely related to income levels. Fig. 2.5 shows
the evolution of TRIPS-compliant legislation implemented in these African countries from the
years 1994 until 2007. The two dotted vertical lines in the figure mark the original deadlines for
developing countries and LDCs, 2000 and 2006 respectively.33 South Africa, Morocco and Coˆte
d’Ivoire are the only African countries that have managed to fully become TRIPS-compliant by
33The new deadline for LDCs is 2013, and 2016 for pharmaceutical and agriculture chemical products.
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Figure 2.3: Countries’ wealth by high TRIPS compliance year
Figure 2.4: Countries’ innovation capacities by high TRIPS compliance year
the year 2000 deadline, and they are from upper-, lower-middle and low incomes respectively.
When examining the implementation efforts of low income countries in Fig. 2.6, compliance
does not appear to be completely affected by income level. Furthermore, comparing the efforts
of low income countries and upper-middle income countries of Fig. 2.6 and 2.7 show that the
implementation efforts are similar, albeit with a particular caveats. An advantage that most
upper-middle income countries have over low-income countries is that they are likely to have more
TRIPS-compliant legislations already in place before the WTO agreement was signed and comes
into force. Nevertheless these figures here show that low income countries exert as much effort
as their richer counterparts in implementing their TRIPS obligations. A possible conjecture
explaining this similar implementation effort by these income levels could be attributable to
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the difficulty of the richer income countries in restructuring their IPR legislations to maintain
protection their local industries.
Figure 2.5: TRIPS compliance for African countries, 1994 — 2007
Figure 2.6: TRIPS compliance for low income countries, 1994 — 2007
And lastly, countries in regional trade agreements (RTAs) include IPR obligations tend to
have their compliant legislations in place sooner than those who are not, as evidenced in Fig.
2.8. The RTAs in question here are the Andean Community, European Communities, OAPI,
ARIPO and NAFTA. This trend lends support to the argument that engagements in RTAs are
beneficial and could complement progress at the broader multilateral level.
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Figure 2.7: TRIPS compliance for upper-middle income countries, 1994 — 2007
Figure 2.8: TRIPS compliance for countries in RTAs, 1994 — 2007
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2.5.2 Future econometrics analysis
Several notable studies have investigated the impact of IPR regimes on economic activities
using the then-available IPR indexes. The TRIPS index that I produce here can be used to
analyze the impact of the TRIPS agreement on those activities as well. Below I run a simple
Pearson pairwise correlation of the TRIPS index for all 53 developing countries with proxies
of innovative activities. For most of the variables, the Pearson pairwise correlation numbers
are positive and significant, indicating that there may be links between the implementation
of the TRIPS agreement and these activities. Pearson pairwise correlation allows us to see the
relationship, if any, between two variables. The advantages of using this correlation to determine
the association between two variables is that it does not require that the variables under study
to have the same units of measurement and avoids casewise deletion.34
Table 2.3 shows values of Pearson pairwise correlation of the TRIPS index with the various
indicators of economic activities. The columns show the different correlation models for varying
income levels.35 The columns labeled “All”, “Not high”, “Middle”, “Low” and “LDC” refer to
the various income levels of the 53 developing countries, where “Not high” refer to all developing
countries in the sample that are not classified as high income by the World Bank .
Correlation TRIPS index
ρ All Not high Middle Low LDCs
Net FDI 0.2996* 0.3112* 0.2919* 0.2835* 0.1933
High Technology % 0.2650* 0.2279* 0.1785* 0.0866 0.1965
Royalties payments 0.2889* 0.3861* 0.3458* 0.4424* 0.0243
Royalties receipts 0.2360* 0.2820* 0.2358* 0.4344* -0.0517
Trademark nonresident 0.4857* 0.4102* 0.2855* 0.7517* 0.6053*
Trademark resident 0.3358* 0.3284* 0.2735* 0.3788* 0.7921*
Patent filing at EPO 0.1778* 0.2031* 0.3429* 0.3583* 0.1722
Patent filing at JPO 0.1298* 0.1466* 0.2856* 0.3329* 0.1333
Patent filing at national patent office 0.1492* 0.1783* 0.1573* 0.2004 -0.2449
Triadic patent filing 0.1444* 0.1396* 0.2889* 0.3295* 0.131
Patent filing at USPTO 0.1556* 0.2074* 0.3656* 0.3980* 0.1814
GDP per capita 0.2932* 0.3662* 0.2332* 0.5788* 0.5541*
Chemical (% value added) 0.0264 0.0333 0.1967* 0.0623 -0.1497
Table 2.3: TRIPS index correlation table
34For a detailed comparison of casewise versus pairwise deletion see
http://www.statsoft.com/textbook/stbasic.html#ccasewise
35Note that in the WTO developing country term is politically motivated, however for this paper I refer
developing countries as those not considered high income countries, whether in the OECD group or not.
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Examination of correlation table shows that although there is a significant and positive
relationship between the TRIPS index and national income per capita, although the relationship
is not very strong for each of the income categories, with correlation varying from 29% to 58%.
This simple association test concur with our graphical analysis that the implementation of the
TRIPS-compliant regime is not necessarily dependent on the countries’ economic development
levels.
Across all income levels there are significant and positive relationships between the index
and FDI, both royalty payments and receipts, trademark, and patent filings at the EPO, JPO
and USPTO. Interestingly patent filing at the national patent office is positive and significant
for models all income levels except for low income countries.
These simple correlations merit further examination of the relationship between these values
and the TRIPS index to determine if there is a causality affect, which will be undertaken in
future research papers.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper attempts to build a TRIPS-specific IPR index to study the impact of the TRIPS
agreement for developing WTO member countries. I make three assumptions: (i) a year prior
to the WTO inception, in the year 1994, members in the sample were not TRIPS-compliant; (ii)
members use the transition period afforded by the TRIPS agreement in implementing their IPR
obligations; and (iii) members are not be able to implement all seven IPR categories simultane-
ously because of various constraints. These assumptions help me construct the TRIPS index by
considering all seven IPR categories separately, narrowing the legislation search to the periods
after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of negotiations, and refrain from using the transi-
tion deadlines as the actual date of full TRIPS compliance. In addition, the assumption would
later allow me to conduct a natural experiment in investigating the impact of the Agreement on
various economic activities of the countries studied.
Analysis of the data shows three implementation trends. Firstly, almost all developing
countries take advantage of the transition periods clause of the Agreement (Art. 65), and in
some cases have exceeded the TRIPS implementation deadline for developing countries, in the
year 2000. Secondly, implementation efforts of developing countries vary, and not necessarily
because of their income levels. Lastly, countries in regional trade agreements (RTAs) that
include IPR obligations tend to comply with TRIPS earlier than the rest. The results confirm
36 Quantifying TRIPS
that the TRIPS agreement leads to a convergence of global IPR protection across countries. It
also makes the case that the Agreement’s implementation is an external factor, neither strongly
influenced by the country’s level of economic development nor by its level of innovation capacity.
This index can be used as a natural experiment to understand how strengthened IPR protection
influences economic activities and behaviors.
The lack of endogenous attribution of IPR level to economic development and convergence
of global IPR across countries lead to the possibility of using this index as a natural experiment
to understand how IPR influences economic activities and behaviors. This TRIPS index will
be used in future research studies to examine the impact of the Agreement on local economic
activities. An interesting case to study would be to examine how the implementation of this
Agreement affect countries with low- and middle-range technological capacities vis-a`-vis access
to new technology and potential for local innovation to name a few.
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APPENDIX
Countries in the sample
*denotes an LDC
Code Latin America & Caribbean Code Africa & Middle East
ARG Argentina CIV Coˆte d’Ivoire
BLZ Belize EGY Egypt
BOL Bolivia GAB Gabon
BRA Brazil GHA Ghana
CHL Chile KEN Kenya
COL Colombia MAR Morocco
CRI Costa Rica MDG Madagascar*
DMA Dominica MUS Mauritius
GTM Guatemala MWI Malawi*
GUY Guyana NAM Namibia
HND Honduras NGA Nigeria
JAM Jamaica SEN Senegal*
LCA Saint Lucia SWZ Swaziland
MEX Mexico TZA Tanzania*
NIC Nicaragua UGA Uganda*
PER Peru ZAF South Africa
PRY Paraguay ZMB Zambia*
SUR Surinam
URY Uruguay
VCT Saint Vincent & the Grenadines
VEN Venezuela
Code Asia Code Europe
BGD Bangladesh* POL Poland
HKG Hong Kong ROM Romania
IDN Indonesia SVK Slovak Republic
IND India TUR Turkey
KOR South Korea
LKA Sri Lanka
MYS Malaysia
PAK Pakistan
PHL Philippines
SGP Singapore
THA Thailand
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Regional trade agreements
Andean Community
Bolivia Columbia Ecuador
Peru Venezuela
OAPI
Cameroon Coˆte d’Ivoire Gabon
Guinea Guinea Equatorial Mali
Mauritania Senegal Chad
ARIPO1
Botswana Gambia Ghana
Kenya Lesotho Malawi
Mozambique Sierra Leone Sudan
Swaziland Tanzania Uganda
Zambia Zimbabwe
EC
Poland Romania Slovak Republic
Turkey2
NAFTA
Mexico
1An intergovernmental organization that cooperates in industrial property matters.
2Bilateral with EC, with the intention of eventually joining when possible.
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Summary of the variables
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max Source
TRIPS index 742 3.636343 2.873804 0 7 Computed
Net FDI as % of GDP 613 1.60E+09 3.80E+09 -1.17E+10 3.05E+10 WDI
High Technology % 564 10.80869 15.79071 0.0003458 74.9573 WDI
Royalties payments 559 2.94E+08 8.51E+08 -100000 8.65E+09 WDI
Royalties receipts 532 3.99E+07 1.51E+08 0 1.86E+09 WDI
Trademark nonresident 221 5938.566 5786.889 124 21147 WDI
Trademark resident 223 12921.84 19958.39 8 92368 WDI
Patent filing at EPO1 568 77.26408 331.8688 0 4326 PATSTAT
Patent filing at JPO2 568 100.6743 571.3816 0 5650 PATSTAT
Patent filing at NPO3 393 4288.687 15471.58 1 145955 PATSTAT
Triadic patent filing 568 39.66549 189.0346 0 2204 PATSTAT
Patent filing at USPTO4 568 219.2377 1172.785 0 15561 PATSTAT
GDP per capita 636 3218.984 4666.643 118.8362 27372.1 WDI
Chemical (% value added) 325 9.145821 5.902041 0.0069126 49.71656 WDI
1European Patent Office
2Japanese Patent Office
3National Patent Office
4United States of America Patent Office
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Graphical compliance of countries by region and income level
Figure 2.9: TRIPS compliance for European countries, 1994 — 2007
Figure 2.10: TRIPS compliance for Latin American and Caribbean countries, 1994 — 2007
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Figure 2.11: TRIPS compliance for Asian countries, 1994 — 2007
Figure 2.12: TRIPS compliance for lower-middle income countries, 1994 — 2007
TRIPS Provision Overview
IPR General definition Term of protection Criteria for protection Rights conferred Exceptions
Copyright and
related rights
Copyright and related rights are
rights provided to expressions and
includes “every production in the
literary, scientific and artistic
domain” regardless of the form or
mode of expression or whether they
were published or not (Berne
Art. 2.1). It also extends to computer
programs well as compilations of data
or other materials (Art. 10.1 &
Art. 10.2). But excludes from
protection ideas, procedures, methods
of operation and mathematical
concepts (Art. 9.2).
For expressions: (i) author’s life plus
50 years (Berne Art. 7.1); or (ii) 50
years from year of authorized
publication; or (iii) 50 years from
year of making (if no authorized
publication) (Art. 12).
For performers and producers of
phonograms: at least 50 years from
when performance was made
(Art. 14.4).
For broadcasting organizations at
least 20 years from year of broadcast
(Art. 14.4).
To qualify for copyright protection,
the work must “by reasons of the
selection and arrangement of their
contents” altogether form an
intellectual creation (Berne
Art. 2(5)). In practice, the level of
originality requirement varies from
country to country.
Right to exclude unauthorized
reproduction or distributions of
copyrighted work and its derivatives
(Berne Art. 6.1, 8, 11 and 12 and
TRIPS Art. 14.2).
Use for public interest allows some
unauthorized copying for limited
purposes (e.g. education, research).
This is also known as the fair use
doctrine in common law countries.
Art. 9(2) of Berne sets out 3-step
analysis to evaluate consistency of
exception: (i) granted in special case
only; (ii) not conflict with normal
exploitation of work; and (iii) not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interest of the author. This provision
is in conformity with TRIPS Art. 13.
Trademark
Trademark is “any sign, or
combinations of signs” that would
distinguish the specific goods or
services from another goods or
services (TRIPS Art. 15.1).
More than 7 years of protection from
initial registration and each renewal
of registration. Indefinite renewal of
trademark registration required
(TRIPS Art. 18).
Distinctiveness of sign, otherwise
distinctiveness may be acquired
through use (TRIPS Art. 15.1).
Possible to require that the signs be
“visually perceptible” (TRIPS
Art. 15.1); or that (ii) registrability
dependent on use but (actual) use
cannot be a condition for filing an
application for registration (TRIPS
Art. 15.3).
Right to prevent use by all third
parties of signs that are similar or
identical to the trademarked sign for
goods or services so as to avoid
confusion (TRIPS Art. 16.1). This
right also extends to prevention of
using the trademarked sign for goods
or services that are not those which
the sign is usually associated with,
other than the rightful holder of the
sign (TRIPS Art. 16.3).
Public interest use allowed (e.g. fair
use and prior user’s rights) as long as
it meets the 3-step criteria set out in
copyrights protection.
Compulsory licensing not permitted
(TRIPS Art. 21).
Geographical
indications
Geographical indications are
indications which “identify a good as
originating in the territory of a
Member, or a region or locality in
that territory, where a given quality,
reputation or other characteristic of
the good is essentially attributable to
its geographical origin” Art. 22.1).
Additional protection is extended for
wines and spirits (Art. 23).
GI protection is conferred to goods
that have distinctive traits identifying
the good to a specified geographical
area.
Prevention of: (a) “the use of any
means in the designation or
presentation of a good that indicates
or suggests that the good in question
originates in a geographical area
other than the true place of origin in
a manner which misleads the public
as to the geographical origin of the
good;” and (b) “any use which
constitutes an act of unfair
competition within the meaning of
Article 10bis of the Paris Convention
(1967)” (Art. 22.2).
Generic names are exlucdable from
protection.
GI of services are not included.
IPR General definition Term of protection Criteria for protection Rights conferred Exceptions
Industrial design
Not defined in TRIPS per se, but
protection for textile designs are
specifically underscored in Art. 25.2.
Protection is usually granted for the
ornamental, aesthetic and functional
(optional) aspects of an industrial
product.
Depends: (i) if protected under
industrial design sui generis regime,
then at least 10 years of protection
awarded (Art. 26.3); or
(ii) if under copyright regime, then
protection at least 50 years post
mortem auctoris; or
1.5[ex] (iii) if under sui generis design
law and copyright, then duration of
protection is at least 25 years.
New or original and independently
created. Possible to exclude design
from protection if the said design is
not significantly different from
“known designs or combinations of
known design features” (Art. 25.1).
Possible to refuse protection for
“designs dictated essentially by
technical or functional
considerations” (Art. 25.1).
Prevention of “making, selling or
importing articles bearing or
embodying a design which is a copy,
or substantially a copy of the
protected design” by third parties,
especially for commercial purposes
(Art. 26.1).
Depends on the protection regime
chosen. Copyright and unregistered
sui generis regimes deliberate copying
is prevented but independent
development of design is permitted.
Under registered sui generis regime,
both deliberate copying and
independent development of design is
prohibited.
Allowed as long as the exceptions: (i)
“do not unreasonably conflict with
the normal exploitation of protected
industrial designs,” (ii) “do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the owner of the
protected design” and (iii) interests
of third parties are taken into
consideration (Art. 26.2).
Patents
Patent is a protection granted to new
process or product inventions,
regardless of the technology field. In
exchange for the patent protection,
the patent applicant has to disclose
the invention “in a manner that is
sufficiently clear and complete” for a
skilled person to carry out (Art. 29.1
20 years from the filing date; if no
original grant system then date is
computed from the filing date in the
system of original grant (Art. 33).
(i) New
(ii) Involve inventive step
(iii) Capable of industrial application
An exclusive right conferred to patent
holder to prevent third parties from
using, making, selling or distributing
the patented products or products
made from the patented process
(Art. 28.1). Rights holder can assign
or transfer the patented product or
process to another holder, and even
to conclude licensing contract
(Art. 28.2).
Members may exclude from
patentability inventions that (i)
would have a negative impact on
society, i.e. for ordre public or
morality reasons; (ii) certain subject
matters such as methods for the
treatments of humans or animals,
plants and animals that have not had
any human interventions (Art. 27.3).
Several conditions have to be met if
using patented invention without the
approval of the rights holder either
for research purposes or compulsory
licensing (see TRIPS Art. 30 and 31
respectively).
Transition periods available for: (i)
developing, LDCs and transitional
economies; (ii) countries with no
product patenting for pharmaceutical
and agrochemical products.
Layout designs of
integrated circuits
Protection offered to IC (“chips” in
IT industry) as well as the
layout-design of the IC, whereby the
IC is in and/or on a piece of material
“intended to perform and electronic
function and the layout-design of the
IC is of three dimensional form that
is intended for manufacture”
(Washignton, Art 2(i) and 2(ii)).
At least 10 years from date of filing
an application for registration or
from first commercial exploitation
(regardless of where first exploitation
took place) (Art. 38.1 and Art. 38.2).
Protection may be limited to not
exceed 15 years after the creation of
the layout design (Art. 38.3).
Possible to protect using sui generis,
copyrights or patents. Terms of
protection thus depends on either one
of the categories listed.
Original in the sense that the layout
designs are “the result of their
creators’ own intellectual effort and
are not commonplace among creators
of layout designs and manufacturers
of IC at the time of their creation”
(Washington Treaty Art. 3.2(a)).
Protection prevents third parties
from “importing, selling or otherwise
distributing for commercial purposes
a protected layout-design, an IC in
which a protected layout-design is
incorporated, or an article
incorporating such IC only in so far
as it continues to contain an
unlawfully reproduced layout-design”
(Art. 36). Does not protect the
layout-design’s functionality.
Exceptions for use without
authorization of rights holder are the
same as applied for patents
(Art. 37.2). Also, exceptions provided
for those creations that were
independently created (Washington
Art. 6.2(c)).
Compulsory licensing only allowed for
(i) anti-competitive grounds; and (ii)
for use by government for
non-commercial purposes.
IPR General definition Term of protection Criteria for protection Rights conferred Exceptions
Undisclosed
information
Defined as information that: (a) not
generally known or readily accessible
to the circle of people who normally
deal with the matter in its precise
configuration and assembly of its
component; (b) has commercial value
because it is secret; and (c)
reasonable effort has been undertaken
to keep the information secret
(Art. 39.2). Protection for data
submitted for marketing approval of
pharmaceutical or agricultural
chemical products is highlighted and
kept separate from the general
treatment of “undisclosed
information.”
Protection lasts as long as
information is kept secret, unless an
independent discover publishes the
secret.
Silent on duration of term of
protection on data submitted for
marketing approval of pharmaceutical
and agricultural chemical products.
Any information that has commercial
value because it is secret and actions
have been taken to ensure its
confidentiality, beyond the key
personnel who usually deal with the
matter.
When data is required to approve
marketing of pharmaceutical or
agricltural chemical products, which
“utilize new chemical entities” that
involved “considerable effort” to
obtain and is not publicly known,
then data submitted should be
protected against unfair commercial
use (Art. 39.3).
Protection against unlawful
disclosure, acquisition and use by
third parties in manner contrary to
honest commercial practice.
None listed under TRIPS provisions.
But differing interpretations of
TRIPS Art. 39.3 in developed
countries have led to differing practice
of allowing use of original data
submitted for marketing approval of
pharmaceutical and agircultural
chemical products to approve generic
products (e.g. to prove
bioequivalence without having to
duplicate test data for generic drugs).
Chapter 3
Does TRIPS Implementation Affect
Access to Foreign Technologies?
3.1 Introduction
Access to foreign technologies is important for developing countries.1 As most developing coun-
tries produce few, if none, innovation within their national borders, acquiring and adapting
foreign technologies to local conditions could be a partial solution to catching-up with the rest
of the world. Firstly, acquiring foreign technology useful for the developing countries would avoid
duplicative costs of research and development (R&D). A prime example are foreign technolo-
gies that are considered general purpose technologies (GPTs) (see Helpman, 1998; Bresnahan
and Trajtenberg, 1992). Secondly, accessing, adapting and exploiting foreign technologies may
enable developing countries to possibly build their own technological capabilities.
Developing countries can access foreign technologies through trade, foreign direct investment
(FDI), licensing and patent applications.2 Locals in the countries can learn about new tech-
nologies from using the imported innovations, working in multinational companies, franchising
or licensing technology from overseas, and interacting with foreign colleagues with expertise in
particular fields of technology. The importance of these modes of technology transfer, especially
trade, FDI and patenting on local economies have been examined by previous researchers and
well reviewed in the papers by Keller (2004), Barba Navaretti and Tarr (2000), and Falvey
and Foster (2006), respectively. Literature on analyzing the importance of licensing on tech-
1I use the terms “access” and “exposure” interchangeably.
2Temporary labor migration is another channel for access to foreign technology. The paper by Mansfield (1985)
alludes to movement of people as source for technology diffusion and this is also applicable to developing countries’
access to foreign technology. However, there is lack of evidence on this channel, probably due to the difficulty of
measuring movement of skilled labor and its impact on foreign technology exposure. A recent theoretical paper
by Kelly (2009) makes an attempt at showing how learning by imitation can impact technological progress.
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nology exposure are usually covered under studies on FDI (see Maskus, 1998; Mansfield, 1993;
Horstmann and Markusen, 1987).
Each of these modes of accessing foreign technology can generate positive spillovers to the
developing countries (see Archibugi and Pietrobelli, 2003b), which may lead to positive economic
growth in the countries through increase in levels of innovative activities in the country (see
Thompson and Rushing, 1999; Gould and Gruben, 1996; Thompson and Rushing, 1996). For
example, imports of intermediate goods and capital-intensive goods have been shown to increase
total factor productivity in the importing countries (Coe et al., 1997). Furthermore, exposure
to foreign technologies has enabled some countries to build their innovative capacities through
learning by doing and by using as evidenced in countries like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan
(Kumar, 2002).
However, accessing foreign technologies is different from diffusion of these technologies. The
difference lies in how these foreign technologies are employed in countries acquiring them. Ex-
posure implies that countries can access the new technologies while diffusion suggests that these
countries can absorb the new technologies acquired, usually because they have some sustainable
levels of absorptive capacities. This paper focuses on the exposure to foreign technologies and
does not deal with diffusion of technologies.
In this paper I question whether the implementation of the Trade-related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement improves developing countries’ exposure to foreign
technologies. This global policy on intellectual property rights (IPR) protection has strength-
ened many developing countries’ protection of intellectual property (IP) systems with the general
objective of ensuring that relatively free movement of technology intensive goods and services
around the world.3 Given that the TRIPS agreement protects intellectual creations as embedded
in goods or services, this strengthened IPR policy should affect and influence the flow of trade,
FDI, licensing and patenting activities into the countries implementing the Agreement.
I investigate whether developing countries’ compliance with the TRIPS agreement facilitates
their exposure to foreign technologies via trade, FDI and licensing.4 My objective in this paper
is to apply the newly built TRIPS-specific index to the three observable channels of technology
exposure. I consider the legislative implementation of the Agreement as well as its enforceability
3The TRIPS agreement is specific to movements of goods, as specified in its preamble. However, given the
intangible aspect of intellectual creation, either via process or product, TRIPS inherently covers services as well.
4I refrain from analyzing the impact of TRIPS protection on patenting activities since patenting activity is
highly dependent on specificities of local patent protection, such as patentable subject matters. In addition,
comparable and reliable patenting data for developing countries is lacking.
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in answering my research question. I further make the distinction between the developing
countries in my sample by distinguishing those with varying degrees of innovative capacities.
Results show that developing countries’ compliance with TRIPS agreement does influence
their exposure to foreign technologies, and that this impact varies according to the countries’
absorptive capacities to a certain extent. The effect becomes more pronounced when I include
a proxy to capture local government’s commitment to enforcing the legislation.
In the following section I review relevant literature investigating the influence of IPR pro-
tection on trade, FDI and licensing and introduce the theoretical framework for my empirical
research. In the third section I outline the methodology for my investigation. I present the results
and analyze them in the penultimate section. And the last section concludes with discussion on
the limitation of this paper.
3.2 IPR and accessing foreign technologies
Falvey and Foster (2006) and World Bank (2008) conduct extensive and exhaustive reviews on
the issue of IPR protection and technology diffusion. Reviewing all the previous research on
this subject matter here would be redundant. In this section I select and survey a few of the
empirical literature on the matter, focusing on their approaches to answering their research
questions. Table 3.1 on page 54 summarizes the studies mentioned here.
3.2.1 Channels of foreign technology exposure
Research studies analyzing the impact of IPR levels of protection and exposure to foreign tech-
nologies differ as to whether strengthened IPR protection unambiguously increases trade, FDI
and/or licensing activities. Most of the differences in the research results stem from difficulty in
measuring the channels of foreign technology exposures and IPR strengths.
The seminal work by Teece (1986) on assessing how the appropriability regime, the com-
plementary assets and dominant design paradigm affect firms’ business strategies to service the
market is as an appropriate framework to analyze how IPR can affect the channels of foreign
technology exposure. He argues that firms can plan a strategy to introduce its invention based
on these three dimensions.
In our particular case, the appropriability regime and complementary assets are useful factors
to consider when discussing how IPR protection can affect developing countries’ access to foreign
technologies. The appropriability regime refers to the existence of weak or strong IPR system
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while complementary assets refer to potential rival firms that have capacity to imitate the firm’s
technological innovation in developing countries.
An innovative firm can choose to service the foreign market either through trade, FDI or
licensing.
When IPR regime is weak but there are no potential or existing rival firms, trade may be the
least risky method to service the foreign market. However, when the IPR regime is weak but
there are some potential or existing rival firms, then establishing a subsidiary in the market may
be the best strategy. On the other hand, when the IPR regime is strong, then the technological
innovator could service the developing country market through trade, if there are no rival firms
and by licensing, if there are some rival firms.5
Therefore, there may be a trade-off between trade, FDI and licensing activities. This trade-
off gives rise to the mix impact of each one of these channels of foreign technology exposure
when assessing the influence of strengthened IPR protection. In addition, firms can choose to
service foreign markets via various combinations of the three channels.
Most empirical studies tend to be optimistic about the relationship of strengthened IPR
protection and trade, FDI and licensing activities. This impact can be further amplified when
the countries accessing these technologies have some level of imitative abilities.6 Countries with
higher imitative abilities tend to witness increase in their exposure to foreign technologies, while
those with weak imitative abilities see none, or negative impact of strengthened IPR protection
(Smith, 1999; Yang and Maskus, 2001).
Trade
Maskus and Penubarti (1995) and Rapp and Rozek (1990) find that strengthened IPR protection
does significantly and positively increase imports in general, but Fink and Braga (1999) could
not find the same significant relationship for trade of high technology imports. Nevertheless,
recent empirical studies employed with more detailed observations find significant and positive
impact of strengthened IPR protection on trade, given the sectors considered and the level of
imitative abilities of the importing countries (Park and Lippoldt, 2007; Smith, 1999).
Park and Lippoldt (2007) examine the aggregates of imports to and FDI flows of 120 countries
comprising of developed, developing and least developed countries (LDCs). They use three
5In this case, the rival firms are not exactly rivals but rather potential collaborators or partners.
6I use the terms “imitative” ability to refer to the ease with which locals can reproduce new technologies.
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different proxies to capture IPR protection effects, patent protection of Ginarte and Park (1997),
copyright and trademark protections. Their findings show different impacts of trade from each
one of these IPR types, with patent protection strongly affecting trade, trademark exerting a
slight impact on trade and no significant impact from copyright protection. Interestingly, they
find that the IPR effect on imports is quantitatively highest in developed countries. Given that
patent rights strength tend to be highly correlated with levels of economic development (Maskus
and Penubarti, 1995; Ginarte and Park, 1997; Rapp and Rozek, 1990), it could be possible that
this IPR measure could be capturing the market size, or effectiveness of legal institutions and
infrastructure in the countries rather than the IPR impact.
Smith (1999) employs United States of America (U.S.) state-level aggregate manufacturing
export data at 2-digit industry codes to 96 countries in the year 1992. Similar to Park and
Lippoldt (2007), she finds that strengthened patent protection does increase flow of U.S. exports
and that this impact varies across industrial sectors. In addition, she divides her sample of
countries by their income levels and divides her countries into four categories depending on their
imitative abilities and strength of patent protection. Therefore Smith considers three dimensions
of the importing countries: their level of economic development, imitative abilities and patent
strength. She finds that most of the differences in patent index on trade can be explained by the
importing countries’ imitative abilities. In particular, she finds that strengthened IPR protection
increases U.S. exports flow to countries with high imitative abilities but decreases exports for
those with weak imitative abilities.7 Smith argues that the contraction of exports from the
United States to countries with weak imitative abilities is probably an exercise of market power.
She explains that the contraction in the flow of U.S. exports to countries with weak imitative
abilities as the U.S. firms’ exercise of monopoly power over the countries.
FDI
Governments of developing countries have underscored the importance of attracting FDI into
their countries, given that the benefits and the spillover impact of foreign multinationals es-
tablishing subsidiaries in the countries can be quite significant. However, evidence of FDI
generating positive spillovers on developing countries has been mixed (see Go¨rg and Greenaway,
2004; Aitken and Harrison, 1999). Nevertheless, empirical studies investigating the impact of
IPR on attracting FDI assume that FDI is generally beneficial for the host country.
Most of the empirical findings show that strengthened IPR protection positively and signif-
7Smith (1999) distinguishes countries by their threat of imitation using R&D per gross national product and
patent index developed by Ginarte and Park (1997).
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icantly influences FDI inflow to countries (see Park and Lippoldt, 2007; Javorcik, 2004; Lesser,
2002; Lee and Mansfield, 1996; Seyoum, 1996), except for Kondo (1995).
Seyoum (1996), using an IPR index that covers copyright, trademark, patent and trade
secret protections built through surveys sent to practitioners in 27 different countries, finds
that differences in countries’ FDI level can be explained mainly by their IPR protection levels,
43% for newly industrializing countries and 35% for developed countries respectively. These
IPR impacts are quantitatively more important than the countries’ respective economic policy
variables, implying that differences in FDI levels are mainly explained by the IPR levels rather
than other economic policy variables such as market size and public investments.
The study by Park and Lippoldt (2007), reviewed earlier in regards to trade, also considers
how FDI is affected by IPR protection. Unlike in the case of trade, they find that all three types
of IPR protection significantly and positively affect FDI inflows to the countries studied. And
similar to their earlier finding of relationship between trade and IPR protection, their result
shows positive and quantitatively higher impact of IPR on FDI for developed countries.
More important than levels of FDI inflow into developing countries is the type of FDI activity
undertaken in the host country. Javorcik (2004) shows that while IPR increases the likelihood
of FDI, the type of FDI activities undertaken in the Eastern European countries studied change
from distribution to manufacturing. This change in composition of the FDI activities is a posi-
tive finding given that manufacturing FDI activities can be assumed to generate more positive
spillovers than distribution types. She uses two proxies for IPR protection, one by Ginarte
and Park (1997) and another which she constructs using the International Intellectual Property
Alliance’s (IIPA) list of Special S301 countries for the United States Trade Representative’s
(USTR) consideration.8 Javorcik’s finding echoes the findings of Branstetter et al. (2007) and
Mansfield (1994).
Mansfield (1994) is the one of the first few papers to establish how IPR protection influences
access to foreign technologies. Results from his survey conducted in 1991 on how IPR protec-
tion affects 100 U.S. multinational companies operating in developing countries show that IPR
protection influences the type of FDI activities in the host countries. This impact is especially
important for multinationals engaging in R&D in the host countries, as well for multinationals
operating in IPR-sensitive industrise such as the chemical industry.
8Every year, the IIPA, which lobbies for enforcement of copyright protection worldwide, publishes a list of
countries that it considers as serious offenders of copyright protection to the USTR. A subset of these countries
usually appears in the USTR’s list of Special S301. Countries who continue to be on the list may be have special
trading rights revoked by the United States, such as the special and differential treatment rights.
Access to Foreign Technology 51
However a recent paper by Zhao (2006) convincingly shows that multinationals can employ
different internal organization structures, benefit from the low cost but relatively highly educated
human capital and minimize its risk of IPR expropriation by local competitors. Therefore, IPR
protection may not be an important element for developing countries to have so as to be exposed
to foreign technology through FDI, especially when there are other factors such as low cost of
production and internal organization that could prevent IPR violations.
Licensing
Royalty and license payments are indicative of licensing activities, and it seems to be the only
channel of foreign technology exposure where there is actual transfer of technology to the country
licensing it. However, it cannot be ascertained if the technologies licensed are new. In general,
studies show that strengthened IPR protection facilitates licensing activities.
The paper by Yang and Maskus (2001) was one of the first few to directly consider the
impact of patent protection on technology transfer, as proxied by royalty and license fees. They
conduct an econometric study of how patent protection affects the flow of U.S. licensing to
affiliated and nonaffiliated firms in 23 countries, using the Ginarte and Park (1997) index on
patent protection. They find that increase in patent protection affects licensing in a non-linear
manner. Specifically, strengthened patent protection negatively affects licensing activities of
countries that initially have weak patent protection. After a specific patent protection level,
further increases in the patent right positively impacts the licensing activities from the United
States.
Yang and Maskus explain that the significant and different effect of patent protection on
licensing activities could be attributable to the fact that patent rights strength correlates highly
with the countries’ imitative abilities, measured by ratio of skilled labor endowment. They
argue that in countries where there is limited imitative abilities, strengthened patent protection
would reduce the cost of licensing the new technology to the licensor which enables the licensor
to appropriate more rent from the technology licensed. This increased rent received from the
licensing country gives less incentive to the technology producer to innovate more and thus
decreases the total number of licensing activities to the country.
However, countries that have reached and exceeded the specific critical patent protection
level tend to have higher imitative abilities. As such, marginal increase in the patent protection
level for these countries would facilitate more licensing activities.
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Co (2007) runs a similar study to Yang and Maskus (2001), but differs by considering how the
local imitative abilities influence licensing activities. In addition to employing the Ginarte and
Park (1997) patent protection index, Co follows Smith (1999) in distinguishing between countries
with high imitative abilities and low imitative abilities. Dummies for high imitative ability equals
one when the country’s R&D expenditure as a percentage of gross national product is higher
than the median R&D expenditure across countries sampled for a particular year, and zero
otherwise. She finds there is a positive and significant relationship between patent protection
and technology transfer in countries with high imitative abilities, but negatively for those with
weak abilities. Her results concur with the Yang and Maskus (2001), although unlike their paper
she assumes linear relationship of licensing and patent protection.
Modes of foreign technology exposure: substitutes or complements
Recent empirical studies have concurrently studied the effects of IPR protection on the different
channels of technology transfers. The rationale behind this is that there may be an impact
of IPR protection on one channel of technology transfer which may then be offset in another
channel. As Ferrantino (1993) clarifies, IPR protection concurrently affects trade, FDI and
licensing activities simultaneously.
Ferrantino (1993) considers how host countries’ IPR protection level influences U.S. firms
choice between exporting or establishing subsidiaries in those countries. Using export and sales
of foreign affiliates data of U.S. firms for the period 1982 and using membership to the Paris
Convention as existence of strong IPR protection, he finds no significant impact of IPR protection
on trade or FDI. However, Ferrantino shows that subsidiaries in countries with strong IPR
protection tend to receive more component sources from and have higher royalty payments
made to their firms located in the United States. His finding echoes those of Javorcik (2004),
suggesting that strong IPR protection affects the composition of FDI activities in host countries.
Smith (2001) examines how IPR protection simultaneously influences the flow of U.S. exports,
affiliate sales and licenses for 50 countries from different income levels for the period 1989,
taking into consideration the countries’ respective levels of imitative abilities. She finds that
strengthened IPR protection, as measured by Rapp and Rozek (1990) patent index, facilitates
technology transfer for all of the three modes and that this effect is stronger for countries with
strong imitative abilities.
And lastly, McCalman (2004) considers how firms in the music industry choose between
licensing or establishing affiliates based on the host countries’ patent protection. Using the
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patent protection index as measured by Ginarte and Park (1997) index, he finds that higher
patent protection positively affects licensing activities.
Table 3.1 on page 54 provides a summary of the empirical work investigating the impact of
strengthened IPR protection on developing countries’ exposure to foreign technologies mentioned
here. In general, most studies find that strengthened IPR protection induces FDI inflow but that
its impact of trade and licensing activities could be dependent on the host countries’ imitative
abilities.
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3.2.2 Simple framework
This paper investigates how developing countries’ implementation of the TRIPS agreement af-
fects their exposure to foreign technologies. In order to do so, I employ a recently built TRIPS-
specific index to examine the subject matter.
TRIPS agreement differs from previous international IPR standards. It sets the minimum
level of international IPR protection, standardizing protection across World Trade Organization
(WTO) member countries. The Agreement is in essence a combination of the main international
rules governing IPR protection, such as the Paris Convention (1883), Berne Convention (1886),
and Rome Convention (1961), but with less implementation flexibilities and an effective inter-
national enforcement mechanism of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. It also includes
provisions of the Washington Treaty (1989) on integrated circuits, acknowledges the protec-
tion of undisclosed information as a formal IPR type, and ensures that computer softwares are
protected as copyrights with minimum term of protection set at the author’s life plus 50 years.
The literature reviewed in previous subsections are predominantly based on patent protection
indexes. These indexes, while still relevant today, are not completely TRIPS-specific. Patent
protection explains one-seventh of the types of IPR protection declared by the TRIPS agreement.
In order to capture countries’ compliance with the TRIPS agreement, we should use an index
which captures particular aspects of the Agreement. An extensive description of how the TRIPS
agreement differs from all other international IPR agreements and review of all available IPR
indexes are documented Hamdan-Livramento (2009) and will not be reviewed here.
The impact of strengthened IPR protection should be more pronounced for countries with
some level of imitative abilities. As Mansfield (1985) finds in his survey of 100 American man-
ufacturing multinationals, countries with some level of imitative abilities present higher risk
for technology exporting firms. Therefore, developing countries’ access to foreign technology is
highly dependent on their imitative abilities.
Proposition 1 Strengthened IPR protection through TRIPS compliance could significantly in-
fluence developing countries’ exposure to foreign technologies, and the significance of this influ-
ence varies according to the countries’ level of imitative abilities.
Legislative compliance with TRIPS agreement may not be sufficient in facilitating access to
foreign technologies, enforcement of the Agreement is also necessary. Recent finding of WTO
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dispute settlement panel report on China’s enforcement measure attests to this importance
(WTO, 2009). The United States argued that China, while having implemented its TRIPS
obligations in its legislation, had not been enforcing the rights of its obligations in practice. The
panel report found in favor with the United States’s claim.
I highlight the difference between statutory compliance and actual enforcement because coun-
tries may fulfill their TRIPS obligations according to their legislations, but may not administer
or enforce these rules as they should, as the WTO case mentioned above proves. I refer to actual
enforcement as the type where the government does not properly enforce its legislations, either
because of budgetary or lack of proper infrastructure to do so. This enforcement aspect should
not be confused with the statutory enforcement outlined in the Agreement detailing specific
legal avenues and course of action in case of an infringement.
Proposition 2 In-book TRIPS compliance is not enough to significantly impact channels of
technology transfer. Developing countries that implement the TRIPS legislation in practice are
more likely to see the influence of TRIPS on access to technologies rather than those that only
comply with the Agreement but do not enforce those agreements actively.
3.3 Data collection
I examine how compliance with TRIPS agreement affects developing countries’ imports, FDI
and royalty and licensing payments for 53 developing countries for the time period 1994–2005.
I attempt to reproduce prior findings on the three channels of developing countries’ exposure
to foreign technologies through econometric estimations. The list of 53 countries in this sample
can be found in the appendix on page B–72.
Four main factors separate my research from other empirical studies on this subject matter.
Firstly, I employ an index that specifically captures countries’ compliance with the TRIPS
agreement. Most empirical papers use patent-specific Ginarte and Park (1997) index, which
measures changes in patent protection every 5 years.
I further make a distinction between legislative compliance with TRIPS agreement and the
enforcement of the agreement by interacting the index with how the governments in the countries
studied enforce laws in general. This enforcement measure is different from the “enforcement”
provisions highlighted by the Agreement, which can loosely be considered as rules outlining
actions to be undertaken at the border with regards to counterfeited goods, and legal avenues
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available for injured parties to obtain remedies for any infringements (Part III of the TRIPS
agreement). The type of enforcement that I try to capture in this paper is the governments
commitment to apply the TRIPS rules and regulations.
Thirdly, I only consider developing countries that enter the WTO membership in the same
year, 1995. This allows me to omit countries that may have had long traditions of IPR protection,
as most developed countries have, and focus on countries that are “new” to strengthened levels
of IPR protection. Using cohorts of WTO member countries who joined in 1995 also controls
for any signalling impact that the membership may have on exposure to foreign technologies.
And lastly, I use the Archibugi and Coco (2004) technological index (ArCo) to distinguish
between developing countries’ levels of imitative abilities. This index assesses countries’ tech-
nological capacities by looking at their technology creation, technological infrastructure and
human skills development. This approach allows me to consider countries that have some im-
itative abilities even if they do not produce the usual indicators of innovative activities, such
as patenting, R&D expenditures and number of scientific articles published. Most of the coun-
tries in my sample are developing countries, and so the ArCo index captures their abilities to
reproduce new technologies.
3.3.1 Dependent variables
My three dependent variables are aggregate imports, net inflow of FDI and, licensing payments,
to be estimated separately, in constant U.S. dollars over the period 1994 to 2005. Data for
aggregate imports is collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator 2007, FDI
from UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2008, and finally royalty and license payments,
licensing, from the IMF’s Balance of Payment database.2
3.3.2 Explanatory variables
TRIPS index
TRIPS identifies seven categories of IPR: copyrights and related rights, trademark, geographical
indications, industrial designs, patents, layout designs of integrated circuits and undisclosed
information. The available indexes mainly focus on patent protection. A few of available IPR
indexes, such as Seyoum (1996), and Park and Lippoldt (2007) do cover other IPR types than
2I attempted to collect bilateral trade, FDI and royalty payments data to follow the seemingly unrelated
regression method that Smith (2001) employs. While bilateral data on trade could be easily collected from the UN
COMTRADE database, those of bilateral FDI data are not as easily accessible without having to pay a significant
amount of contribution. In addition, data on bilateral royalty and licensing payments seem non-existent.
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just patent protection, unlike Rapp and Rozek (1990), however they are limited in terms of years
surveyed and numbers of countries covered. The list of countries flagged by the IIPA for weak
copyright enforcements, as used by Javorcik (2004), looks at copyright only and is probably
biased by the market size of the countries flagged.
The index I employ in this paper examines developing countries’ compliance with their
TRIPS obligations annually from 1994–2006. The Park and Lippoldt (2007), and Ginarte and
Park (1997), indexes used in papers reviewed earlier only capture legislative changes every 5
years, possibly averaging out impacts of legislative changes that may occur annually.
And lastly, the TRIPS index I employ in this study is not highly correlated with countries’
level of economic development, unlike the Ginarte and Park (1997) index. Prior to TRIPS
countries were able to apply the level of IPR protection that suited its industrial policies best.
Thus countries who have not built their capacities to innovate tended to have weaker IPR
protections while those countries that have attained a specific level of economic development
tended to have higher IPR protection, likely reflecting their high innovative capacities. But
given the TRIPS agreement, these countries have to apply this minimum level of IPR protection
regardless of their development levels.
The following Table 3.2 summarizes how the Hamdan-Livramento (2009) index is con-
structed. The index is an unweighted sum of the seven IPR types listed in the Agreement,
ranging from 0 to 7, where a TRIPS index of 7 implies that the country is fully compliant with
its TRIPS obligations. The index gives equal weighting to each IPR category but since I am
only interested in analyzing how levels of TRIPS compliance affects the modes of technology
transfer, this does not pose a major problem.
In similar vein to Smith (1999), I take into consideration the countries’ imitative abilities in
analyzing how strengthened IPR protection could affect their exposure to foreign technologies.
Smith divides the sample of her countries into four categories: those with high imitative abilities
but weak IPR protection, high imitative abilities with high IPR protection, low imitative abilities
but weak IPR protection and those with low imitative abilities and high IPR protection. In
building her dummy variables to divide her countries into four categories, Smith considers their
R&D expenditure as percentage of the gross national product and the Ginarte and Park (1997)
patent strength index. Unlike Smith who considers cross-section sample, I have a panel of 53
countries for 11 time periods.
In addition, I use the ArCo index to account for the countries’ varying levels of imitative
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IPR Category Total
Copyright and related rights 1
Computer program 13
Rental rights 13
Related rights 13
Trademark 1
Geographical indications 1
Industrial designs 1
Patents 1
Patents 13
Pharmaceutical patents 13
Plant varieties 13
Layout designs of integrated circuits 1
Undisclosed information 1
Trade secrets 12
Data submission 12
Total 7
Table 3.2: TRIPS index method
abilities. Countries with imitative abilities are able to copy new technologies and under weak
IPR protection, the risk of IPR expropriation is significant. As such, higher IPR protection level
in those countries should affect the countries’ exposure to the foreign technologies. The variable
dArCo 1 takes the value of 1 when the countries are classified as “leaders”, “potential leaders”,
and “latecomers”, and 0 otherwise. I further distinguish between these subset of countries
with some imitative abilities by creating the dummy variables dArCo lead and dArCo late,
corresponding to countries with high- and low imitative abilities respectively. Dummy variable
dArCo lead takes the value of 1 when the countries are designated as “leaders” and “potential
leaders”, and 0 otherwise, while dArCo late takes on the value of 1 when the countries are
“latecomers”, and 0 otherwise.3 Table 3.3 summarizes the dummies assigned to differentiate
between countries’ imitative abilities.
ArCo Imitative abilities dummies
categories dArCo 1 dArCo lead dArCo late
Leaders x x
Potential leaders x x
Latecomers x x x
Marginalized
Table 3.3: Dummies for imitative abilities
And lastly, I interact the TRIPS index with data collected by the World Bank on rule of
law to take into consideration the actual enforcement of the TRIPS agreement. This variable
measures the locals’ confidence in its government to enforce the law. The World Bank describes
3See the appendix for more information on how the ArCo index differentiates between the four levels of
technological capabilities.
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it as “the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular
the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime
and violence.” I refrain from using other measures of IPR enforcement, such as countries flagged
by the IIPA, like Javorcik (2004), or those compiled by the IMD and the World Economic Forum
institutions because of their inadequate coverage of years and countries. The variable rule of
law index ranges from −2.5 to 2.5, with 2.5 being the maximum value achievable.4
Control variables
Purchasing power - I measure countries’ purchasing power by using GDP per capita in constant
U.S. dollars. Developing countries with higher GDP per capita will purchase more goods on
average. I expect this variable to be significant and positive as higher purchasing power indicates
higher demand and so should positively impact the modes of technology transfer. Data is
collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator 2007.
Market size - I measure market size using countries’ total population size. Larger population
indicates more demand. I expect the coefficient associated with this market size measure to be
significant and positive. Data is collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator
2007.
Open - Countries that trade more are likely to have open regimes. Openness is measured as
the total imports plus exports per country’s GDP. The more open countries are, the easier it
would be to have access to foreign technologies. I thus expect the measure to be significant and
positive. Data is collected from the World Development Indicator 2007.
The descriptive statistics and correlation table for these variables can be found in the ap-
pendix on pages B–73 and B–74 of this paper. There is no problem with correlation between the
explanatory variables except for the various permutations of the TRIPS index with the dummies
measuring countries’ imitative abilities.
3.3.3 Regression methods
I estimate the following log-linear model specification to answer Proposition 1 :
ln(Xi,t) = α+ β1 ∗ ln(GDPcapi,t) + β2 ∗ ln(Popi,t) + β3 ∗ (Openi,t)
4The rule of law measure starts from 1996, but I assumed that the measure did not change very much and
used data from 1996 for the years 1994–1995.
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+γ1 ∗ (TRIPSi,t−1) + γ2 ∗ (TRIPS ∗ dArCo 1i,t−1)
+γ3 ∗ (TRIPS ∗ dArCo leadi,t−1) + γ4 ∗ (TRIPS ∗ dArCo latei,t−1)
+i,t (3.1)
where Xi,t refers to the three channels of technology transfer, trade, FDI and licensing at time
t, TRIPSi,t−1, TRIPS∗dArCo 1i,t−1, TRIPS∗dArCo leadi,t−1, and TRIPS∗dArCo latei,t−1
refer to the TRIPS index and its permutations according to levels of imitative abilities from the
year before. I assume that the countries’ past year TRIPS compliance and its permutations
influence the current access to foreign technologies.
In order to test Proposition 2, I modify Eq. 3.1 above to include the index of TRIPS
interacted with a variable that captures government enforcement dimension:
ln(Xit) = α+ β1 ∗ ln(GDPcapi,t) + β2 ∗ ln(Popi,t) + β3 ∗ (Openi,t)
+γ1 ∗ (TRIPSi,t−1) + γ2 ∗ (TRIPS ∗ dArCo 1i,t−1)
+γ3 ∗ (TRIPS ∗ dArCo leadi,t−1) + γ4 ∗ (TRIPS ∗ dArCo latei,t−1)
+γ5 ∗ (TRIPSri,t−1) + γ6 ∗ (TRIPSr ∗ dArCo 1i,t−1)
+γ7 ∗ (TRIPSr ∗ dArCo leadi,t−1) + γ8 ∗ (TRIPSr ∗ dArCo latei,t−1)
+it (3.2)
where Xi,t, TRIPSi,t−1, TRIPS ∗ dArCo 1i,t−1, TRIPS ∗ dArCo leadi,t−1, and TRIPS ∗
dArCo latei,t−1 are the same as in the previous equation. The difference between Eq. 3.1 and
Eq. 3.2 is the inclusion of the variable, TRIPSri,t−1, the interaction of two continuous variables,
the TRIPS index and the rule of law index.
3.4 Results and analysis
There are three possible outcomes of how TRIPS compliance can influence any one of the
developing countries’ channels to access foreign technologies. In the first case compliance with
the TRIPS agreement has no significant impact on the channels of technology access. This
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outcome would imply that TRIPS protection is not a main issue for how technology transfer
takes place, either for trade, FDI or licensing.
A second possible outcome is market expansion effect, whereby there is a positive and sig-
nificant relationship between TRIPS implementation and the means of technology exposure.
Innovative firms increase their supply of goods or services to the developing country markets
because they no longer face risk of imitation from local firms. Market expansion thus refers
to the foreign firm expanding the penetration of its goods and/or services into the developing
countries’ markets.
Lastly, strengthened IPR protection through compliance with TRIPS in developing countries’
markets could influence firms to exert their market power. Strengthened IPR protection via
TRIPS implementation implies that foreign innovative firms face lower risk from imitation of
their goods or services in the local markets. But instead of an increase in the supply of goods
and/or services from these firms, the developing countries observe contraction in their exposure
to foreign technologies. The only plausible explanation for this outcome is that the innovative
firms decide to exercise their monopoly control, arguably in an anti-competitive manner, over
the goods and/or services and extract further rent from the markets in the developing countries.
In this section I report my findings and proceed to analyze the results. In general TRIPS
compliance influences FDI and licensing modes of technology diffusion, especially when we taken
into consideration the countries’ imitative abilities. This influence is prominent when the com-
pliance also includes the enforcement, as in the case for imports.
3.4.1 Estimation methods
I run separate regressions for the three variables that measure access to foreign technologies:
imports, FDI and licensing activities. I first pool the observations together and run ordinary least
square (OLS) estimations, clustering the standard errors by countries to account for possible
correlation between the errors from one year to the next per country. I then test whether pooling
and running OLS regression is appropriate and find that panel regressions of fixed effect (FE)
and random effects (RE) estimations are superior to the pooled OLS ones. For all the models
estimated, I correct for heteroscedasticity using robust White standard errors and include year
intercepts to account for year-specificities.5
5I run a Wald joint-significance test on the coefficients of the year-intercepts and reject the null hypothesis at
5% significance level.
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Using the Hausman test, I find that for regressions using FDI and licensing as dependent vari-
ables respectively can be estimated using the RE estimation while import should be estimated
using the FE.
One of my dependent variables, licensing, has some zero values for certain countries, implying
that some countries do not license any technologies. The appropriate model would be to use
the Tobit model. I run pooled Tobit and panel Tobit RE estimation censored at lower-limit
of zero to account for these zero values. The results from the Tobit estimation do not deviate
significantly from panel estimations.
For every regression model I run, using the three dependent variables separately, I find that
the control variables capturing purchasing power, market size and openness are significant and
positive as per expectation. The outputs for models estimated for each dependent variable
capturing access to foreign technology can be seen in the appendix. I report the regression
output of pooled OLS, FE- and RE- estimations side-by-side according to the equations that I
estimated.
Recall that in Eq. 3.1, I attempt to investigate how TRIPS compliance affects imports, FDI
and licensing respectively. I then estimate a permutation of Eq. 3.1 with the interaction variable
of TRIPS index and the enforcement variable, rule of law, which I refer to as Eq. 3.1’. And
lastly I estimate Eq. 3.2 which considers how both in-book and actual enforcement of TRIPS
compliance affects the channels of exposure to foreign technologies.
In order to facilitate analysis of the regressions estimated, I report the estimates of the TRIPS
in-book and enforcement variables, as well as the interaction with the dummies capturing levels
of imitative abilities, in Tables 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 respectively. A summary of the regression
estimated for equations (3.1), (3.1’) and (3.2) can be found in Table 3.4. Each column in Table
3.4, and thus also in Tables 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7, correspond to specific model estimation. I report
the full regressions for each dependent variables of imports, FDI and licensing in the appendix.
Estimations for Eq. 3.1 are on pages B–75 onwards, Eq. 3.1’ are on pages B–79 onwards and
Eq. 3.2 are on pages B–83 onwards.
Each column reported in the tables below correspond to the models that I estimated. Column
I is the baseline model where I run the dependent variable against the control variables of
countries’ purchasing power, market size and openness. It also includes year-specific effects.
Columns II until III are estimations of the baseline model and includes TRIPS index and its
permutations of variables TRIPS*dArCo 1, TRIPS*dArCo lead and TRIPS*dArCo late. In
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column IV I estimate all the TRIPS variables together. These regression models provide results
to answer my first hypothesis in Proposition 1.
Columns II’, III’ and IV’ are similar to the regressions I run for Proposition 1, but the dif-
ference is that I now use the TRIPSr measure, capturing both the countries’ TRIPS compliance
and the government enforcement of the legislation. The same interpretation given above applies
for columns I’ until IV’ for Eq. 3.1’.
In columns V to VII, corresponding to models V to VII, I run the regressions for Eq. 3.2,
which estimates both the in-book and enforcement of TRIPS compliance as well as the control
variables. In column VII, corresponding to model VII, I estimate all the TRIPS variables
together.
Eq. 3.1 Eq. 3.1’ Eq. 3.2
I II III IV II’ III’ IV’ V VI VII
TRIPS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TRIPS 1 Yes Yes
TRIPS lead Yes Yes
TRIPS late Yes Yes
TRIPSr Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TRIPSr 1 Yes Yes
TRIPSr lead Yes Yes
TRIPSr late Yes Yes
“Yes” corresponds to estimations which include the TRIPS variable.
Columns labeled I through IV correspond to models I to IV in the analysis
Table 3.4: Summary sheet for model analysis
Following Yang and Maskus (2001) and McCalman (2004), I also considered that there may
be a non-linear relationship between countries’ TRIPS implementation and their exposure to
foreign technologies. However, two issues argue against looking at this non-linear relationship.
Firstly, I use an index of TRIPS compliance, which theoretically does not capture the strength
of the IPR regime. An increase in the index implies that the developing country is one step
closer to fully complying with its obligations. Once the country reaches a TRIPS score of 7,
it cannot go up any further. From a legislative perspective, the “strength” of IPR protection
depends not only on the scope of the protection but also the depth of protection. Any “increase”
from TRIPS perspective would be to further define each component of the seven IPR categories.
Capturing this depth of IPR protection is a different and complicated manner, outside the scope
of this paper. Nevertheless, I run Eq. 3.1 with the squared values of the TRIPS permutations
but find no significant difference between the regressions with the squared values and without
of TRIPS index.
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3.4.2 Analysis of results
I summarize the results for imports, FDI and licensing in the following Tables 3.5, 3.6 and
3.7 respectively. Recall as I mentioned earlier, I find that regression using imports as depen-
dent variable is best with FE estimation, FDI with RE estimation, and licensing with panel
Tobit random-effects estimation. These tables report the estimates using the above-mentioned
regression methods.
Eq. 3.1 Eq. 3.1’ Eq. 3.2
II III IV II’ III’ IV’ V VI VII
TRIPS 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.011* 0.010*
TRIPS 1 0.000 -0.008
TRIPS lead -0.001 -0.003
TRIPS late 0.000 0.010
TRIPSr -0.005 0.001 0.003 -0.003 0.009 0.010
TRIPSr 1 -0.009 -0.016*
TRIPSr lead -0.001 -0.005
TRIPSr late -0.046*** -0.057***
note: ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1
Table 3.5: Estimates of FE regression on Imports
Eq. 3.1 Eq. 3.1’ Eq. 3.2
II III IV II’ III’ IV’ V VI VII
TRIPS -0.002 -0.017 -0.017 0.011 0.012 0.013
TRIPS 1 0.017 0.005
TRIPS lead 0.067*** 0.018
TRIPS late 0.008 -0.007
TRIPSr 0.045*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.048*** 0.046* 0.046*
TRIPSr 1 0.004 0.006
TRIPSr lead 0.053* 0.033
TRIPSr late -0.009 -0.016
note: ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1
Table 3.6: Estimates of RE regression on FDI
Eq. 3.1 Eq. 3.1’ Eq. 3.2
II III IV II’ III’ IV’ V VI VII
TRIPS 0.089 -0.014 -0.020 0.075 -0.064 -0.073
TRIPS 1 0.161* 0.202
TRIPS lead 0.032 0.246*
TRIPS late 0.190** 0.101
TRIPSr -0.043 0.020 0.023 -0.025 -0.076 -0.078
TRIPSr 1 -0.102 0.029
TRIPSr lead -0.086 0.089
TRIPSr late -0.152 -0.024
note: ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1
Table 3.7: Estimates of panel Tobit RE regression on Licensing
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3.4.3 Proposition 1
I estimate Eq. (3.1) to test the first hypothesis of whether TRIPS compliance affects the three
channels of access to foreign technologies, given the countries’ imitative abilities levels. I refrain
from prejudging the expected coefficients on the TRIPS variable and its permutations. The
coefficients could either be of market expansion, market power effects, or are not statistically
significant at all.
TRIPS variable positively affects FDI inflow and licensing activities, and this impact varies
according to the countries’ imitative abilities. An increase of TRIPS compliance by one unit
leads to a 6.7% increase in FDI inflow in the RE estimation. Regression of licensing as depen-
dent variable shows that TRIPS compliance has a market expansion impact on licensing for
countries with some imitative abilities. In particular this impact is captured by countries with
low imitative abilities, where an increase in one unit of the TRIPS index affects the licensing
activities of countries with low imitative abilities by 1.9%.
3.4.4 Proposition 2
I run permutations of Eq. 3.2 regression to investigate my second proposition, which includes the
enforcement term. The coefficients for the control variables are significant and positive across
all models and for all of the three channels of technology exposure. In general, results show that
in-book TRIPS compliance coupled with government’s enforcement of the rules is important in
facilitating developing countries’ access to foreign technologies.
Consider columns V—VII of the FE estimation of imports in Table 3.5. We find that
TRIPS compliance displays a significant and positive impact on imports, which is a market
expansion effect. However, countries with some imitative abilities experience a market power
impact whereby an increase in the TRIPS compliance index holding enforcement constant,
prompts a reduction in imports of goods and services by 0.5% (= 1.1%− 1.6%). In particular,
countries with low levels of imitative abilities experience contraction of the imports of goods
and services when they comply with their TRIPS obligations.
An interesting result can be observed if we substitute the government enforcement of TRIPS
agreement measure into the result obtained for countries with low imitative abilities. The
variable rule of law ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with 2.5 being highest achievable value. Taking the
mean of this measure for the subset of our developing countries with weak imitative abilities, we
find that compliance with TRIPS increases their imports of goods and services by approximately
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1.9% on average.6 This result suggests that countries with low levels of government enforcement
would experience market expansion effect.
As for FDI, TRIPS compliance when considered with the enforcement aspect significantly
and positively affects FDI inflow. Unlike the result from our estimation of Eq. 3.1 earlier, this
impact does not vary according to the countries’ imitative abilities.
For licensing, we observe that various permutations of the coefficient of TRIPS index in-
teracted its enforcement measure do not significantly impact licensing activities at all. TRIPS
compliance is still important, although now the importance of developing countries’ compliance
with the Agreement is significant for countries with strong imitative abilities.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper investigates whether developing countries’ implementation of the TRIPS agreement
increase their exposure to foreign technologies through imports, FDI and licensing. I find that
there is significant and positive impact of complying with TRIPS on developing countries, espe-
cially when we consider the actual enforcement of the TRIPS compliance. In addition, taking
into consideration the countries’ levels of imitative abilities, I find that TRIPS implementation
positively influences licensing activities for countries with strong imitative abilities, negatively
impacts imports of countries with weak imitative abilities, as Smith (1999) finds. However,
there is no difference in the impact TRIPS implementation on FDI inflows when we consider
countries’ imitative abilities.
The results I obtain do not deviate too much from theory. Diffusing new technologies to
countries with strong imitative abilities but weak IPR protection is risky for firms. Fear of
technology imitation prompts these firms to carefully choose how they would service these mar-
kets. Therefore protection of IPR as per the international standards should minimize these risk
factors.
Licensing may be the riskiest channel of the three modes access to foreign technologies.
And I find that increasing IPR protection to the international standard increases the licensing
activities of those countries with strong imitative abilities.
The increase in FDI inflow to developing countries as they comply with their TRIPS obliga-
tions also resonates with theory. Although the difference in FDI inflow does not vary according
6This is calculated using mean of rule of law for countries with low imitative abilities, multiplied by the estimate
for TRIPSr late plus the estimate for in-book TRIPS compliance, TRIPS. Thus [(−0.153) ∗ (−0.057) + 0.01] ∗
100 = 1.8721.
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to countries’ levels of imitative abilities, this could be explained by the various management
strategies that the firms undertake to protect their innovations within the firm structure as
Zhao (2006) explains.
However, one concern is in regards to imports. Countries that do have strong imitative
abilities should see a marked increase in their channels of accessing foreign technologies versus
those with low or no imitative abilities. And while TRIPS compliance does lead to an increase
in imports of goods and services, the impact is negative for developing countries with weak
imitative abilities. This suggests that firms exert their market power in countries with weak
imitative abilities, which is detrimental to these countries. This empirical finding suggests there
could be a role for the establishment of anti-competitive authorities in these economies.
In summary, developing countries’ compliance with the TRIPS agreement does influence
their access to foreign technologies, and these impacts vary according to the countries’ imitative
abilities. When we consider governments’ commitment to enforcing this Agreement factor, we
find that this impact becomes more pronounced, except in the case for FDI.
3.5.1 Limitation
This paper is not without limitations, most of them are due to difficulties in finding appropriate
measures to capture technology diffusion, local imitative abilities and changes in IPR legislations.
I attempt to capture developing countries’ exposure to foreign technologies using trade, FDI
and licensing as proxies, suggesting that increase in any one of these channels directly leads to
beneficial spillovers for these countries. While trade, FDI and licensing are channels for accessing
foreign technologies, using the aggregate level data partially explains the big picture. Access
to these data on bilateral terms per industry sectors would be more informative. For example,
studies that are able to use firm-level data to investigate this issue such as Branstetter (2006);
Javorcik (2004); Smith (2001, 1999) have richer data and their analysis more reliable. However
the data that they employ are specific to the firm-level bilateral flows from the United States
and they also include developed countries in their estimation, except for Javorcik (2004). In
addition they use patent index which is likely to be strongly correlated with levels of economic
development and is measured once every 5 years. The correlation of the TRIPS index with levels
of economic development is less than 50%.
The magnitude of spillover effects from accessing new technologies are highly dependent on
how the transfers take place, which is also dependent on the local imitative abilities. While
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I try to control for imitative abilities using the ArCo index, the problem lies with how we
usually measure this concept, via patent applications, R&D expenditures, years of schooling,
and scientific articles to name a few. Although in using data from the World Bank and various
UN agencies accounts for cross-country comparability and reliability of data, there are still some
limits to these data.
Firstly, R&D expenditures data are not as widely collected for developing countries as for
developed countries, and may not be as reliable. Secondly, number of patent applications is
highly dependent on the existence of a reliable and effective patent system. Countries with no
or weak effective patent systems may not have as many patent application numbers as they
could. This could be rectified by a local innovator patenting overseas, such as at the USPTO or
the EPO. However, a local innovator’s ability to patent overseas would be dependent on the cost
of the patent application. In addition, the types of innovation in developing countries could be
of different nature from those in developed countries. As such applying for patent for adaptive
or imitative innovations will not be captured by the patent system. This would also hold true
for developing countries’ scientific publications output where most of publications may not be
published in the leading scientific journals.
The TRIPS index may be an inadequate attempt at quantify legislation changes. But it
is the only available index that tries to capture developing countries’ efforts in implementing
this international standard of IPR protection, even if it is the minimum standard. While the
construction of the index is based on obligations highlighted in the Agreement, there are some
flexibilities for each WTO member country to implement their obligations. Countries can define
the parameters of their obligations according to their interpretation of the rules and regulations
even if the scope of these flexibilities that were once available under the Paris, Berne and Rome
Conventions are now limited. For example, there are two interpretations on protection of undis-
closed information on data submitted to government agencies. The loose interpretation argues
that countries can allow the marketing of generic drugs if those drugs can prove bioequivalance
with the original patented drug, while the strict interpretation argues against this. In addition,
there may be nuances in each legislation related to the TRIPS agreement that are not captured
by the TRIPS index.
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APPENDIX
Countries in the sample
L. America & Caribbean ArCo Africa & Middle East ArCo
Argentina potential leader Coˆte d’Ivoire marginalized
Belize Egypt latecomer
Bolivia latecomer Gabon latecomer
Brazil latecomer Ghana marginalized
Chile potential leader Kenya marginalized
Colombia latecomer Morocco marginalized
Costa Rica latecomer Madagascar* marginalized
Dominica Mauritius latecomer
Guatemala latecomer Malawi* marginalized
Guyana latecomer Namibia marginalized
Honduras latecomer Nigeria marginalized
Jamaica latecomer Senegal* marginalized
Saint Lucia Swaziland marginalized
Mexico latecomer Tanzania* marginalized
Nicaragua latecomer Uganda* marginalized
Peru latecomer South Africa latecomer
Paraguay latecomer Zambia* latecomer
Surinam latecomer
Uruguay potential latecomer
Saint Vincent & the Grenadines
Venezuela latecomer
Asia ArCo Europe ArCo
Bangladesh* marginalized Poland potential leader
Hong Kong leader Romania potential latecomer
Indonesia latecomer Slovak Republic potential leader
India latecomer Turkey latecomer
South Korea leader
Sri Lanka latecomer
Malaysia latecomer
Pakistan marginalized
Philippines latecomer
Singapore leader
Thailand latecomer
*denotes an LDCs
The ArCo technological capabilities indicator classify countries according to the country’s
creation of technology capabilities, the technological infrastructures and the development of
human skills. The countries are then subdivided into four main groups: leader, potential leader,
latecomers and marginalized. Leaders are the group of countries with ability to create and sustain
technological innovation. Potential leaders have invested in the necessary infrastructure, such
as human capital and technological infrastructure, to build the countries’ innovative capacity
but have yet to achieve significant levels of innovation. Latecomers refer to countries that are in
the process of building their human capital and technological infrastructure concurrently. And
lastly, the marginalized are group of countries that do not even have significant access to “old”
technologies. They mostly consist of least-developed countries.
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Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variables
ln: Imports 628 21.7793 1.83211 17.7175 25.7058
ln: FDI 630 19.9462 1.25012 13.3812 23.653
ln: Licensing 508 16.0526 3.30142 0 21.8292
Explanatory variables
ln: GDP per cap 636 6.51583 1.17463 3.80328 9.70698
ln: Pop 636 16.2516 1.9987 11.1716 20.8136
Open 628 84.6783 58.8815 16.2996 456.088
rule of law 624 -0.1528 0.65477 -1.65 1.81
TRIPS-specific variables
TRIPS 583 3.18554 2.79902 0 7
TRIPS 1 539 2.87229 2.9397 0 7
TRIPS lead 539 0.91558 2.15832 0 7
TRIPS late 539 1.95671 2.75194 0 7
TRIPSr 574 -0.3704 2.8831 -10.43 12.67
TRIPSr 1 539 -0.1853 2.75656 -8.61 12.67
TRIPSr lead 539 0.4916 1.76613 -6.23 12.67
TRIPSr late 539 -0.6769 1.95259 -8.61 4.46667
Table 3.8: Descriptive statistics
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Chapter 4
TRIPS implementation and
Exploitation of Foreign Technologies
4.1 Introduction
Developing countries’ implementation of the Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS)1 agreement creates a dual issue vis-a`-vis exploitation of foreign technologies by firms
in developing countries. On the one hand, the compliance with the Agreement should en-
courage access to the technologies as strengthened intellectual property rights (IPR) protects
foreign inventors from unlawful expropriation of their intellectual creation. On the other hand,
stronger IPR could raise the barrier to acquiring the foreign technology and thus discourage
its exploitation.2 Therefore total impact of strengthening IPR protection on use of the foreign
technology would depend on whether the increased exposure to new technology outweighs the
higher transaction cost of acquiring it.
This paper examines how TRIPS implementation, which strengthens developing countries’
IPR protection level, affects entrepreneurs’ use of foreign technologies. Concentrating on en-
trepreneurs enables me to investigate how budget-constrained economic agents are effected by
the change in the rules governing the exploitation of technologies from abroad, especially when
these agents’ economic activities are dependent on the use of the foreign technologies.
I find that TRIPS implementation adversely influences local entrepreneurs’ use of new tech-
nology. This evidence implies any possible access to new technology may be outweighed by
the increase in cost to acquire and later exploit that technology. In addition, I find that this
1I use “TRIPS” and “Agreement” interchangeably.
2I use the terms “IPR” to refer to the general intellectual property rights protection while “TRIPS” refers to
a specific IPR standard.
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influence varies across industry sectors and categories. Considering that the bulk of developing
countries in this sample has potential to imitate foreign technology, the results presented here
is contrary to argument that strengthened IPR protection would encourage more exploitation
of new foreign technologies. Instead, they lend support to the argument that strengthened IPR
system creates higher barrier to using technologies from abroad for developing countries.
In the following section I provide literature review on the relationship between IPR and
entrepreneurship, briefly discuss the TRIPS agreement, and outline the framework for my in-
vestigation. Section 3 describes in detail the data I use in this paper as well as the econometric
methodology. The penultimate section presents and analyzes the results of this research, and
section 5 concludes with discussion on the limitation of this paper, and future research questions.
4.2 IPR protection & Entrepreneurs
IPR protection provides a mechanism for the entrepreneurs to appropriate their returns to in-
novation (Casson, 1995).3 By granting monopoly rights to the inventor of an invention, IPR
protection ensures that the inventor’s cost in the research and development (R&D) of her inven-
tion can be recouped upon commercialization. The inventor can start her own business based
on her invention or she can license her invention off to another firm.4 Her decision between
two commercialization options would depend on the appropriability regime and her rivals’, or
collaborators’, complementary assets (Teece, 1986).5
If our inventor decides to start her own business, the IPR protection on her invention would
ensure that other competitors would face legal barriers in trying to blatantly imitate her technol-
ogy, thus ensuring that she would be able to profit from her invention when she starts her own
company. Shane (2001), using patent data assigned to Massachusetts Institute of Technology
between 1980 and 1996, shows that effective patent protection increases the likelihood of new
technology exploitation through firm formation. Furthermore Burke and Fraser (2005) find that
self-employment rates in 34 countries, most of them members of the Organization of Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), are positively influenced by IPR protection, although
they do not suggest possible explanations for this result.
3Throughout this paper I refer to ”innovation” as the commercialization of an ”invention”. In addition, I use
the terms “innovation” and “technology” interchangeably.
4In both cases, our inventor is also an entrepreneur, the difference between the two cases is the market that
she competes. By starting her own company, our inventor/entrepreneur engages in the traditional goods market.
By licensing her invention out to another firm, our inventor/entrepreneur competes in the market for technology.
5Teece introduces a third factor of commercialization, the dominant design paradigm, which refers to stan-
dardization issues. This standardization matter, while relevant, is outside the scope of this paper.
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Our inventor can also choose to license her invention out to another firm to commercialize
rather than producing it herself. This is also made possible by the IPR regime. IPR protection
creates transferrable rights, allowing for the trade of invention between “suppliers”, in this case
is our inventor, and the “demanders”, other firms. Shane (2004), in studying the effect of
the Bayh-Dole Act implementation, shows that this change in the United States’ IPR law by
allowing universities to patent their research output provides incentive for universities to increase
patenting in fields where “licensing provides an effective mechanism for acquiring new technical
knowledge.”
The inventor’s ability to decide between starting her own business based on her invention
or licensing it off to other firms suggests that IPR protection grants her control on downstream
activities of her invention. But what about the entrepreneur who would like to exploit others’
innovations rather than invent her own? How would this entrepreneur’s activity be affected by
the IPR protection regime?
The other impact of IPR protection on entrepreneurial activities is in regards to accessing
and exploiting the innovations, the downstream activities of innovation.6 Strengthened IPR
protection can affect entrepreneurs’s access and exploitation of new technologies in two ways:
(i) through increased exposure to a wider selection of technologies, or (ii) creating barriers to
using the technologies.
As mentioned earlier, IPR protection creates transferrable rights and allows for innovations to
be traded in the market for technology. This market provides a wider selection of technologies for
the entrepreneurs to choose in one setting. The more technologies our entrepreneur can choose
and the lower search and transaction cost she will face, the higher will her marginal benefit be.
As Arora et al. (2001) argue, the existence of market for technologies enables entrepreneurs in
start-ups to focus on meeting their customers’ needs and demands without the complication
of searching for new technologies to serve this need. Therefore strengthened IPR protection
facilitates access to and exploitation of technologies (see Arora and Merges, Arora and Merges;
Arora et al., 2003; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001).
However, strengthened IPR protection grants the rights holders of the technologies higher
returns to their innovations through providing monopoly rights, thus curtailing competition for
those particular technologies. Studies on strategic patenting behavior in large firms show that
6I distinguish between “access” to and “exploitation” of new technologies by arguing that “exploitation”
requires the actual use of the technology while “access”, like “exposure”, do not involve actual usage of the
technology. For example, an entrepreneur can have access to a particular technology but if she does not exploit
it then she cannot benefit from that technology.
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firms patent to prevent competition and also as a bargaining chip for access to one another’s
technology (Reitzig, 2004; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). In addition, inventors can exercise their
monopoly power by charging monopoly prices for their technologies or preventing others from
exploiting their technologies through legal avenues. For example, our inventor could impose
reach-through clause in her licensing arrangements that could reduce the potential profit of
entrepreneurs exploiting her technology. This could have the effect of reducing the number of
entrepreneurs acquiring this technology to be used in their businesses.
The monopoly price of exploiting a specific new technology and the anti-competitive behavior
from using IPR protection creates social welfare loss as well. High cost of accessing and exploiting
existing and new technologies creates obstruction to the possible diffusion (Cornish, 1999) and/or
incremental improvements of the innovations (Scotchmer, 1991).
Therefore there are two possible outcomes of how IPR protection affects entrepreneurial
activities. IPR protection may be useful to entrepreneurs to protect their innovation from
their competitors, allowing for commercialization of the innovation. The reduced risk from
commercialization of technologies facilitates broader dissemination, giving other entrepreneurs
more opportunities to exploit technologies appropriate for their businesses. But IPR protection
could also pose a significant barrier for these entrepreneurs to exploit new innovations in their
firms either because of the higher cost imposed or through complex licensing contracts which
minimizes the entrepreneurs’ returns to investment. The sum of stronger IPR protection impact
on the entrepreneurial activities is thus ambiguous.
As for developing countries, strengthened IPR protection is likely to affect their access and
exploitation of technologies acquired from abroad, given that most developing countries are net
importers of technology.
4.2.1 Entrepreneurs in developing countries
For entrepreneurs in developing countries the influence of IPR protection on access and exploiting
to new technology is slightly different than for developed countries. A large portion of new-to-
the-world technologies are invented in countries that have strong innovative capacities, such as
the developed countries. It is thus reasonable to assume that developing countries would depend
on developed countries to produce new technologies rather than competitively generating their
own.
Prior to TRIPS agreement, most developing countries had weak IPR protection. The absence
of strong appropriability mechanism, such as IPR protection, allowed for blatant copying of in-
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ventions which were then commercialized and in most cases helped develop a viable technological
industry. Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan are a few examples of countries that
have profited from the lax enforcement of IPR protection, building their current comparative
advantage as technology exporters on the weak IPR protection regime (Kumar, 2002). In addi-
tion, the Romanian president openly acknowledged that pirated copies of Microsoft’s Windows
software helped developed his country’s software industry (Zoeller, 2007). But the benefit of
free-riding on foreigners’ R&D investment for the countries with weak IPR regimes does not
stop there. The commercialization of these imitations of foreign technologies offered a cheaper
alternative to customers, therefore allowing customers that demand them but cannot initially
afford them, the possibility to acquire and use them at lower cost.
In light of this free-riding problem of acquiring technologies, reverse-engineering them and
commercializing the cheaper versions of the original technologies by entrepreneurs in countries
with weak IPR regimes, firms in developed countries find significant reduction in their returns
to investment. In response, they can either reduce the export of technologies overseas and
minimize the imitation of their technologies, establish their own subsidiaries in those countries,
or ignore the blatant copying of their technologies with the hopes of later recapturing these
customers through offering complementary products.7 If developments at the international
trade negotiations is to be believed, weak IPR protection poses a significant barrier to trade for
these firms (see Gervais, 2003; Watal, 2001; Correa, 2000).
Feeble, or no, IPR protection in developing countries arguably limits dissemination of new
technologies to these countries. The preamble of the TRIPS agreement highlights this issue
by stating that its objective is to “reduce distortions and impediments to international trade.”
In addition, studies analyzing the flow of technologies to countries via trade, foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) and research and development (R&D) argue that strengthening IPR protection
would increase countries’ exposure to foreign technologies (see Branstetter et al., 2007; Branstet-
ter, 2006; Javorcik, 2004; Mansfield, 1994; Smith, 1999; Maskus and Penubarti, 1995). However,
these studies stop short of answering how this IPR reform would affect entrepreneurs’ exploita-
tion of foreign technologies, except for Yang and Maskus (2001). The paper by Yang and Maskus
(2001) finds that strengthened IPR protection increases U.S. licensing flow to unaffiliated firms
in foreign countries when those countries have achieved a certain level imitative abilities, but
not for those who do not have any or little imitative abilities.
7The Economist magazine reported on how Microsoft tolerates the widespread use of pirated versions of its
software in China because this use, even if illegally, has given it huge market share. Microsoft hopes that once
these customers can purchase the legitimate copies of its software, that they would prefer to stick to using its
software (see The Economist, 2008).
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More access to technologies from abroad is beneficial, but if these technologies cannot be used
by local entrepreneurs because of the higher cost of acquiring them, then the overall benefit of
TRIPS implementation for developing countries may not be as positive as some empirical studies
have argued.
Therefore, there is a tradeoff in regards to strengthening IPR regimes, through TRIPS
implementation, for entrepreneurs in developing countries. TRIPS protection increases the
entrepreneurs’ exposure to foreign technologies but it may make the technologies less accessible
because of the higher cost of acquiring them.
4.2.2 TRIPS
The TRIPS agreement requires developing countries to modify their IPR system to reflect those
of developed countries. It imposes a general strengthening of IPR system for many developing
countries, regardless of the country’s level of economic development, although there are some
flexibilities in regards to implementation time and various legal interpretation of its texts.8
Before the TRIPS agreement, countries were able to implement differing levels of IPR protec-
tion according to what they deemed were appropriate for their levels of economic development.
This is no longer the case under the TRIPS agreement. The one-size-fits-all approach to TRIPS
implementation would create different welfare impact across countries. Technologically advanced
countries, usually comprised of developed countries, are likely to benefit from the implementation
of the Agreement at the expense of less-technologically advanced countries, usually comprised
of developing countries (Grossman and Lai, 2002).
While most empirical studies to date suggest that strong IPR regimes would increase coun-
tries’ exposure to foreign technologies (see Branstetter et al., 2007; Park and Lippoldt, 2007), it
is not obvious if this increased exposure would lead to increased exploitation of the technologies.
Studies by Falvey et al. (2006) and Helpman (1993) show that developing countries with high
imitative abilities are likely to be adversely effected by strengthened IPR protection. In addi-
tion, reports by the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights and the World Bank’s Global
Economic Prospects convincingly argue that TRIPS implementation would create welfare loss in
terms of higher cost of using foreign technologies in these countries (Commission, 2002; World
Bank, 2001). The negative impact of TRIPS on these countries may be further aggravated by
the potential increase in cost of acquiring the foreign technologies by local firms (Commission,
8For a brief introduction to the TRIPS agreement see Hamdan-Livramento (2009); Gervais (2003); Watal
(2001); Correa (2000).
Using Foreign Technology 93
2002), although Branstetter et al. (2007) argues that this may be mitigated by increased multi-
national activities in the developing country. Again, the overall impact of strengthened IPR
protection varies, and this time according to channels of foreign technology exposure of the
developing countries (Glass and Wu, 2007; Lai, 1998).
This paper attempts to shed more light on the matter by examining the effect of TRIPS
implementation on entrepreneurs’ exploitation of foreign technologies in developing countries.
4.2.3 Framework
Harmonized and strong IPR protection worldwide begets a global market for technologies by
creating transferrable rights for intellectual creations. Market for technologies facilitates trans-
action of knowledge via licensing arrangements, thus increasing access to new technology and
potential exploitation of these technologies. Therefore strong IPR protection should function in
a similar manner to market for technologies by increasing access to and exploitation of foreign
technologies by entrepreneurs in developing countries.
However, most entrepreneurs in developing countries have smaller budgets than their coun-
terparts in developed countries to purchase their technologies from abroad. Therefore, their
use of these technologies is constrained by their abilities to pay. Entrepreneurs in developing
countries may no longer have access to cheaper versions of foreign technologies because TRIPS
protects these technologies from expropriation. And if the price of acquiring the legitimate ver-
sion of the technologies are too high, then the number of entrepreneurs using technologies from
abroad would likely decrease.
The sum of the total impact of TRIPS implementation on exploitation of foreign technologies
in developing countries would depend on whether the access to the technologies outweighs the
cost of exploiting the technologies.
There are two distinct issues in regards to developing countries’ implementation of the TRIPS
agreement that need to be emphasized. The first is the countries’ in-book legislative compliance.
The other is the countries’ actual enforcement of its obligations under the Agreement, not to be
confused with the statutory enforcement specified in the TRIPS agreement.
It is possible that a country could have all of its TRIPS obligations enacted and implemented
in its legislations but not enforce its obligations. On the other hand, it is possible that a country
could not have managed to implement all of its TRIPS obligations but enforce whatever rules
and regulations of the TRIPS provision it has implemented strongly.
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Proposition 1 Developing countries’ TRIPS implementation could either facilitate or hinder
local entrepreneurs’ use of new foreign technologies. However the total influence of this strength-
ened IPR protection depends on whether the countries implement TRIPS in its legislations and
enforce the rules and regulations of the TRIPS provisions in practice concurrently.
Some industries are likely to be strongly affected by IPR protection than other industries
(see Cohen et al., 2000; Mansfield, 1994, 1986; Levin et al., 1987). Foray (2004), for example,
argues that IPR protection is important for industries that face high R&D costs, where imitation
and reverse engineering is widespread and when the final cost of production manufacturing is
low. I thus expect that the influence of strengthened IPR protection on access and exploitation
of new technologies would vary across industrial sectors and categories.
Proposition 2 The overall impact of TRIPS, both the compliance and enforcement aspects,
should vary across industrial sectors. Entrepreneurs operating in IPR-sensitive sectors should
be significantly more affected than the rest.
4.3 Data collection
Lack of empirical research on examining the relationship between entrepreneurs, their activities
and how they relate to IPR protection can be attributed to the difficulty of measuring en-
trepreneurship. Different definitions of entrepreneurship and the methods of data collection are
some of the factors which make cross-country comparison on this subject matter complicated.
Recent international initiatives by the World Bank and the GEM research programs attempt
to overcome this difficulty by setting out standardized questions and definitions to capture this
elusive measure of economic activity by an important economic agent. I employ the information
gathered on entrepreneurship to study the impact of strengthened IPR protection by TRIPS
implementation on entrepreneurs in developing countries.
4.3.1 GEM data
The GEM research program has collected entrepreneurship data at the country level since 1998.
A standardized adult population questionnaire is sent to the teams of participating countries to
implement the survey. The frequency of countries’ participation in the survey varies from year
to year, and thus we do not have consistent observations number over per year over the period
of study.9
9For more information on GEM data collection design and implementation see Reynolds et al. (2005).
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GEM defines entrepreneurs as “adults in the process of setting up a business they will
(partly) own and/or currently owning and managing an operating young business.” Three main
questions are posed to capture these “entrepreneurs”: (i) whether the individual is trying to start
a new business; (ii) whether the individual is starting a new business as part of her employment;
and (iii) whether the individual is currently the owner who also manages the business. Positive
response to any one of the questions above leads to the round of questions that would ascertain
which entrepreneurship stage she is in and the industry she intends to compete in.
GEM classifies the individual and the new business as either nascent entrepreneur, baby
business or established business according to the stage of business start-up, its age and if the
business has generated any profits and/or made salary payments. If the individual is actively
trying to start a firm, or has started a firm but has not received any profit or salary then it
is considered as nascent entrepreneur. A baby business refers to an individual who owns or
manages her own business, which is less than 42 months old and the new business has generated
profit and/or made salary payment. Established business refers to an individual who owns and
manages the business which is over 42 months old and the business has generated profit and/or
made salary payments.
One of the questions asked during the survey is whether the entrepreneur will or is using new
technology in the production of her goods or services. The question posed is, “[w]ere the tech-
nologies or procedures required for this product or services generally available more than a year
ago?” A technology is considered new if it was not available a year ago in the region of interest
even if the technology is known or used elsewhere. For the purposes of this study, I consider
the “new” technology as foreign technology since the GEM definition of new technology implies
that it is “new to the region” and that most developing countries are technology importers.10
I obtain the dependent variable, the share of entrepreneurs using new technology, by dividing
the total number of entrepreneurs’ acknowledging that they use new technologies by the total
number of entrepreneurs per industry and industry sectors for the period 2002 – 2004. This
variable captures the nascent entrepreneur and the baby businesses in the sample, which I
loosely refer to as new entrepreneurs. The GEM research team considers nascent entrepreneurs
and baby businesses as representative of the country’s “total entrepreneurial activity” (TEA).
TEA is defined as the share of the working adult-age individuals (18-64) who are either actively
trying to start new entrepreneurial companies, or who are currently acting as owner-mangers of
10Throughout the rest of this paper, I use the terms “new technology” and “foreign technology” interchangeably.
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new entrepreneurial companies.11
Fourteen countries of interest are captured in this sample, although not all were consistently
surveyed from 2002 – 2004. Ten of these countries can be considered “developing” while four
are “developed”.12 In the sample, 85% of the new entrepreneurs surveyed respond that they
use new technology in the production of their goods or services. But only 42% of them use
new technology to produce for the local market. I only consider the subset of entrepreneurs
who produce for the local market given that IPR protection is national in application. Putting
it differently, TRIPS implementation is national in scope, and thus entrepreneurs who use the
technology and produce their goods and services using the technology for the local market are
the ones who would be affected by TRIPS. Entrepreneurs producing for overseas market would
be affected by the IPR protection in those foreign markets.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 on show the total count of new entrepreneurs who mention that they use
new technology for the year 2002 for eleven countries. Peru, Uganda and Venezuela were not sur-
veyed in the year 2002 and thus do not appear in these figures. While the share of entrepreneurs
using new technologies in their production is high in comparison to the whole entrepreneur pop-
ulation (Fig. 4.1) only a small percentage of those using new technology can classify them as
medium- or high-technologies (Fig. 4.2). This graphical result is not surprising if we consider
that most small businesses are marginal businesses, simple and small-scaled (see Bhide, 2000).
Furthermore, entrepreneurs in developing countries may not have the proper financing to use
medium- or high-technology in their production or engage in innovative activities.
11I do not have enough information from the raw data to ascertain which firms are established businesses and
so omit this entrepreneur proxy from our study.
12Countries self-select themselves into categories “developing” and “developed” at the World Trade Organization
(WTO), while the least-developed countries (LDCs) are identified by the United Nations. In our sample one of
the countries defined as “developed” can be considered “developing”, i.e. Mexico, while another which defines
itself as “developing” can be considered “developed” from income level perspective, i.e. Singapore. Nevertheless,
we bundle these countries together and consider them as “developing countries” to increase our sample size for
the purposes of this research study.
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Figure 4.1: TEA: new technology vs. no new technology, 2002
Figure 4.2: TEA: using new technology by type, 2002
98 Using Foreign Technology
4.3.2 TRIPS index
The main variable of interest is the implementation of the TRIPS agreement. The Agreement
sets out the minimum IPR protection standard, enforceable through the World Trade Organi-
zation’s (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism.13
The TRIPS index built by Hamdan-Livramento (2009) capture our countries’ compliance
with the Agreement, ranging from 0 – 7, where a score of 7 implies that the country is fully TRIPS
compliant. It covers seven IPR types: copyright and related rights, trademark, geographical
indication, industrial designs, patents, layout designs of integrated circuits and undisclosed
information. A bivariate dummy variable is assigned to each IPR category when the country
complies with that category. The TRIPS index is calculated as an unweighted sum of the seven
IPR categories:14
IPR Category Total
Copyright and related rights 1
Computer program 13
Rental rights 13
Related rights 13
Trademark 1
Geographical indications 1
Industrial designs 1
Patents 1
Patents 13
Pharmaceutical patents 13
Plant varieties 13
Layout designs of integrated circuits 1
Undisclosed information 1
Trade secrets 12
Data submission 12
Total 7
Table 4.1: TRIPS index method
I mentioned briefly in the subsection 4.2.3 of the distinction between in-book TRIPS com-
pliance and actual enforcement of the TRIPS rules and regulations. The “actual enforcement”
of TRIPS refer to the non-statutory enforcement of the Agreement, whereby the government
actually commits to practising the TRIPS laws that it has committed to follow. I employ a
yearly index produced by the IMD institution in Lausanne, Switzerland, on perceived enforce-
ment of IPR protection as a proxy. Senior business leaders are queried as to whether local
IPR protection “are adequately enforced”. The index ranges from 1 – 10, with 10 the highest
achievable score. I collect this data from the IMD’s World Competitiveness Yearbook.
13For more information on the controversial nature of this agreement see Correa (2000).
14See Hamdan-Livramento (2009) for more information on how the index is built.
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I introduce a third proxy of TRIPS, the product of the TRIPS in-book compliance and its
enforcement. This variable ranges from 0 to 70, where a score of 70 implies that the country has
fully implemented its TRIPS obligations into its legislation and is strongly enforcing the TRIPS
rules and regulations.
I am also interested to see how countries that have implemented all seven IPR categories of
the TRIPS agreement fare against the other countries. So we create a dummy that takes the
value of 1 when the country has achieved full TRIPS compliance, i.e. TRIPS index of 7, and
0 otherwise. I interact this dummy with the enforcement proxy to see how countries that have
full TRIPS compliance influence their local entrepreneurs’ use of new foreign technologies.
4.3.3 Control variables
In my analysis I control for the competition level, opportunity to open business and gross
domestic product (GDP) growth of the countries in the sample.
Competition level - Share of entrepreneurs who compete in highly competitive market by
country and industry sectors. I expect that highly competitive market would positively influ-
ence the use of new technology since the new firm would need to differentiate itself from the
incumbents. Data is collected from the GEM database for the years 2002–2004.
Opportunity - Share of entrepreneurs who identify that opportunity is the sole reason for
opening the business by country and industry sectors. I assume that new business that are
opportunity-based would positively influence the use of new technology in the production. Data
is from the GEM database for the years 2002–2004.
GDP growth - Rate of country growth and proxy for country’s boom or recession periods. For
developing countries, an economic boom may negatively impact entrepreneurship as employment
opportunities may be better elsewhere than starting one’s own business. Putting it differently,
the opportunity cost of starting one’s own business may be higher in times of good economic
growth. Data is obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator database.
I present the descriptive statistic for the variables and the Pearson pairwise correlation
of these variables in the appendix on pages 112 and 113. There are no serious problems of
correlation between the explanatory variables, except with the interaction variable of the dummy
for full TRIPS compliance and the product of the dummy for full TRIPS compliance with
enforcement.
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4.4 Econometrics specification and analysis
This research paper examines how a developing country’s compliance with the TRIPS agreement
influences the share of entrepreneurs using new technology in the production of their goods or
services, where the dependent variable proxies for access and exploitation of new technology by
entrepreneurs residing in developing countries.
I have two variables of interest which are measured yearly, in-book TRIPS compliance and
its enforcement for fourteen countries for 2002 – 2004. I interact these two measures of local IPR
protection together to examine how statutory compliance and enforcement of TRIPS affect our
share of entrepreneurs using new technology.15 I assume that any changes in the IPR system
will only take effect a year after, and so I lag these measures by a year.16 In addition I generate
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a country is fully compliant with its TRIPS
obligations (score of 7) and 0 otherwise to compare with countries that are not fully TRIPS
compliant.
I assume that the impact of TRIPS compliance on the share of new entrepreneurs using new
technology would be more relevant if the market that the entrepreneur competes in is local.
Therefore we concentrate on the subset of entrepreneurs who intend to service and are servicing
the local customers, and investigate how these entrepreneurs respond to the country’s level of
TRIPS implementation.
I have a panel dataset for the fourteen countries for 2002 – 2004 per 4-digit industry sectors
(ISIC Rev. 3). Thus we have information of the share of new entrepreneurs using new technology
for every industry sector at the 4-digit level per country for the 3 years, giving us a total of
1,536 observations. However, not all countries are consistently observed over the 3 years and we
are missing information on the TRIPS enforcement proxy for Peru. Therefore we are left with
an unbalanced panel dataset of 1,408 observations.
4.4.1 Econometrics model
First, I pool the data and run ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, correcting for het-
eroscedasticity as a benchmark for the following equation:17
15I use the term IPR protection to refer to the general intellectual property rights protection. TRIPS is a
specific IPR standard.
16TRIPS legislation has not changed much over the years of study 2002—2004 for our 14 developing countries
and thus one year of lag is adequate. For robustness check, we tried up to two years of lag and the result is
consistent with the one year lag.
17I further estimate our model using OLS cluster where the standard errors are computed using the sandwich
estimator, with no significant difference from the first OLS regression without cluster.
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Yit = α+ β ∗Xit−1 + γ ∗ Zit + it (4.1)
Y is the share of entrepreneurs using new technology per total population of entrepreneurs
servicing the local market. X is a vector containing the following TRIPS variables, the TRIPS
index (TRIPS), its enforcement (IMD), a dummy for full TRIPS compliance (d(TRIPS)), an
interaction between the TRIPS index with the perceived IPR strength (TRIPS∗IMD)and inter-
action term of the dummy for full TRIPS compliance with the IPR strength index (d(TRIPS)∗
IMD), all lagged by one year. And finally Z is the vector with the control variables mentioned
in subsection 4.3.3.
FE estimation allows us to control for country-specific effects, and deals with possible omitted
variables issue. This method explains the variation of the dependent variable from its mean
by exploiting the unobservable country-specific constant term, which can be measured by the
difference of the explanatory variables from its mean per country and industry sector for the
case:
Yit − Y i = β ∗ (Xit−1 −Xi) + γ ∗ (Zit − Zi) + (it − i) (4.2)
The drawback of using the FE estimation is that the TRIPS dummy variable d(TRIPS)
drops because it does not vary over the time period of study. And thus we no longer can
observe how being fully TRIPS compliant in-book affects the share of entrepreneurs’ using
foreign technology. I consider using the random effects (RE) estimation but the Hausman test
rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated under FE are the same as under RE.
Thus I stick to FE estimation. In addition, under the assumption that FE model is correct,
estimation of the coefficients produced by OLS and RE regressions are inconsistent. Table 4.2
below displays the result of our FE estimation while Table 4.9 on page 115 in the appendix
compares the OLS with the RE-estimations.
The baseline column in the table is the regression of our dependent variable on our control
variables. It shows that the share of entrepreneurs using new technology in the production of
their goods or services is negatively affected by GDP growth but are positively influenced by the
competition level at home and the opportunity-based reason for starting the business. All of the
coefficients of the control variables are statistically significant at the 5% level. The coefficient
signs fall within our expectations.
Columns I – III, corresponding to models I – III, are regressions of our dependent variable
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FE
baseline I II III IV V
(coef/se) (coef/se) (coef/se) (coef/se) (coef/se) (coef/se)
Highly competitive market 0.628*** 0.569*** 0.521*** 0.628*** 0.469*** 0.510***
(0.042) (0.044) (0.044) (0.042) (0.045) (0.044)
Opportunity-based 0.553*** 0.522*** 0.526*** 0.552*** 0.510*** 0.523***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.047) (0.050) (0.045) (0.046)
GDP growth % -0.004** -0.005** -0.002 -0.004* -0.012*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
TRIPS -0.413*** -0.612***
(0.093) (0.107)
IMD 0.204*** 0.203*** 0.179***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
TRIPS*IMD 0.000 -0.050***
(0.007) (0.007)
d(TRIPS) (drop)
d(TRIPS)*IMD -0.430***
(0.105)
cons 0.148*** 2.641*** -0.939*** 0.137 4.279*** 0.377
(0.016) (0.558) (0.131) (0.206) (0.777) (0.339)
R2 0.645 0.659 0.693 0.645 0.713 0.702
N 1,408 1,408 1,408 1,408 1,408 1,408
note: ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1
Robust standard errors in brackets
Table 4.2: Fixed effects estimation with robust std. errors
on the baseline model and the three different proxies for TRIPS compliance respectively. The
coefficient for the TRIPS compliance index, TRIPS, is significant and negative, indicating that
a unit increase in the country’s compliance with the TRIPS legislation decreases the share of
entrepreneurs using foreign technology by 41%. However, a unit increase in TRIPS enforcement,
IMD, leads to a 20% increase in our dependent variable. The interaction term of in-book TRIPS
implementation and TRIPS enforcement, TRIPS*IMD is not significant however.
In column VI, corresponding to model VI of the same Table 4.2, I regress our dependent
variable on the three proxies of TRIPS, TRIPS, IMD and TRIPS*IMD, along with the control
variables altogether. As in the earlier regression models of I–II, TRIPS implementation decreases
the share of entrepreneurs using foreign technology while its enforcement has a positive effect
on the same variable. However, unlike model III, the interaction term between in-book TRIPS
compliance and its enforcement is now significant and negative. The interpretation of these IPR
proxies can be decomposed in the following manner:
dY = βTRIPS ∗ dTRIPS + βIMD ∗ dIMD + βTI ∗ TRIPS ∗ dIMD + βTI ∗ IMD ∗ dTRIPS (4.3)
I show the impact of TRIPS implementation and its enforcement effect on the dependent
variable in the Table 4.3 below by considering what happens in the “average” case where TRIPS
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is equal to 5.3 and its enforcement variable, IMD, equals to 5.7. I also consider the extreme
cases, the upper limit case of TRIPS equals 7 and IMD is equal to 10 and the lower limit case
of TRIPS equals 0 and IMD is equal to 1. For interest purposes, we also analyze the impact for
the lowest observable value of TRIPS and IMD in our sample, 0.83 and 3 respectively.
dY
dIMD
dY
dTRIPS
TRIPS=7 -0.147 -1.112 IMD=10
TRIPS=5.3 -0.062 -0.897 IMD=5.7
TRIPS=0.83 0.1615 -0.762 IMD=3
TRIPS=0 0.203 -0.662 IMD=1
Table 4.3: Analysis of IPR proxy impact for Model V
Table 4.3 shows that TRIPS implementation negatively influences the share of entrepreneurs
using new technology. However, this negative impact can be slightly mitigated if its enforce-
ment is weakened. It then follows that a country’s low compliance with the TRIPS agreement
but strongly enforces the Agreement positively affects the share of entrepreneurs using new
technology in the production of their goods or services.
For the last model in column V of Table 4.2, I run the control variables along with the
dummy variable for countries that have reached full TRIPS compliance, d(TRIPS), the TRIPS
enforcement index, IMD and the product of full TRIPS compliance dummy with the enforcement
index, d(TRIPS)*IMD. This regression model examines how countries that have achieved full
TRIPS compliance differ from those that have not. The results show that there is a significant
difference between countries that have and have not implemented the TRIPS agreement fully. In
general, strengthened IPR protection reduces the share of entrepreneurs using new technology
by 25% on the share of entrepreneurs using foreign technologies.18
4.4.2 TRIPS impact varies by industry sector
My second proposition argues that the impact from countries’ TRIPS implementation on the
share of entrepreneurs using foreign technology should vary across industry sectors. I exploited
the industry classifications at the 1-digit industry code and also by categories, and find that the
results from the FE regressions concur with our second proposition.
I re-run regressions of models I – VI for every sector at the 1-digit ISIC code and by cat-
egories. I examine to see if TRIPS implementation impacts the entrepreneurs in these sectors
and categories differently.19 In order to save space, I only report the estimates of TRIPS im-
plementation (TRIPS), its enforcement (IMD), the product of TRIPS implementation and its
18This value is calculated by: 17.9%-43%=-25%.
19The industrial categories are: extractive, transforming, business service and consumer oriented.
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TRIPS enforcement (TRIPS ∗ IMD), and the interaction term of the dummy for full TRIPS
compliance and enforcement (d(TRIPS) ∗ IMD) per the sectors and categories examined.
Table 4.10 on page 116 in the appendix displays the estimated coefficients for each of the IPR
proxies. The columns numbers and the respective models correspond to those in Table 4.2 but
are by sectors, both at the 4 category level and 1-digit ISIC Rev. 3 industry code. We can observe
in Column II that TRIPS implementation is negative and significant for the transforming and
consumer-oriented industry categories, and specifically affects industries such as manufacturing;
mining and construction; transportation, communication and utilities; wholesale, motor vehicle
sales and repair; and retail, hotel and restaurant. The proxy for TRIPS enforcement is positive
and significant for all of the industry categories except for the financial, insurance and real estate
sectors and statistically insignificant for the health, education and social services sector.
Model IV estimation in Table 4.4 shows how TRIPS implementation proxy, its enforcement
and the interaction term between the two affect the share of entrepreneurs using new technology.
We can observe that the top three sectors significantly and adversely affected by TRIPS are the
manufacturing, consumer service and the transportation, communications and utilities sectors
respectively.
I conduct a similar exercise as I have done for Model IV in the previous subsection, by
examining how each IPR proxy affects the share of entrepreneurs using new technology per
industry category and sector. I only examine the categories and sectors that are significantly
affected by TRIPS implementation in Table 4.11 on page 117 of the appendix. When examining
the impact of a unit increase in TRIPS implementation while holding its actual enforcement
constant in Table 4.11, we find that the manufacturing, consumer services and the retail, hotel
and restaurant sectors are the top three sectors significantly affected. Similar to the general case,
we find that this adverse effect of TRIPS implementation can be partially offset by weakening
TRIPS’ actual enforcement per sectors.
Results of FE regression on Model V give further support that TRIPS implementation affect
varies by industry category and sector. Here I examine how full TRIPS compliance impacts
the share of entrepreneurs using foreign technology per sector, as well as per category. Unlike
in Model IV, the highest adverse impact of full TRIPS compliance is on the consumer services
sector. It is unusual and interesting that the TRIPS enforcement index impacts the financial,
insurance and real estate sector negatively, when for other sectors its influence is positive.
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IV
TRIPS IMD TRIPS*IMD N
(coef/se) (coef/se) (coef/se)
4 categories
Extractive -0.886 0.347** -0.135*** 97
(0.601) (0.138) (0.053)
Transforming -0.745*** 0.225*** -0.043*** 539
(0.129) (0.052) (0.013)
Business service -0.130 0.245*** -0.044** 2 48
(0.258) (0.069) (0.018)
Consumer oriented -0.620*** 0.197*** -0.055*** 524
(0.181) (0.039) (0.011)
SIC 1-digit
Agriculture, forestry, hunting, fishing -0.886 0.347** -0.135** 89
(0.603) (0.139) (0.053)
Mining, construction -0.687*** 0.284*** -0.018 67
(0.170) (0.086) (0.017)
Manufacturing -0.918*** 0.389*** -0.085*** 258
(0.342) (0.105) (0.031)
Transportation, communications, utilities -0.831*** 0.066 -0.029 105
(0.230) (0.104) (0.023)
Wholesale, motor vehicles sales, repair -0.748*** 0.112* -0.043** 143
(0.290) (0.062) (0.018)
Retail, hotel, restaurant (drop) -0.429** -0.085 47
(0.213) (0.059)
Financial, insurance, real estate -0.732*** 0.270*** -0.055*** 278
(0.198) (0.054) (0.014)
Business service -0.154 0.243*** -0.044** 201
(0.264) (0.088) (0.021)
Health, education, social services 0.015 0.055 -0.016 103
(0.491) (0.090) (0.019)
Consumer services -0.881* 0.148** -0.084*** 117
(0.509) (0.069) (0.029)
Robust standard errors in brackets
note: ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1
Table 4.4: FE estimates for models IV by industry category & sector
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V
IMD d(TRIPS)*IMD N
(coef/se) (coef/se)
4 categories
Extractive 0.241** -0.701 97
(0.110) (0.446)
Transforming 0.242*** -0.111 539
(0.048) (0.199)
Business service 0.190*** -0.700** 248
(0.060) (0.291)
Consumer oriented 0.162*** -0.566*** 524
(0.039) (0.152)
SIC 1-digit
Agriculture, forestry, hunting, fishing 0.241** -0.701 89
(0.111) (0.448)
Mining, construction 0.331*** 0.072 67
(0.073) (0.247)
Manufacturing 0.367*** -0.266 258
(0.092) (0.596)
Transportation, communications, utilities 0.124 0.202 105
(0.094) (0.433)
Wholesale, motor vehicles sales, repair 0.068 -0.522* 143
(0.058) (0.292)
Retail, hotel, restaurant -0.257*** -0.656*** 47
(0.058) (0.080)
Financial, insurance, real estate 0.243*** -0.508*** 278
(0.054) (0.181)
Business service 0.190*** -0.666** 201
(0.073) (0.337)
Health, education, social services 0.020 -0.169 103
(0.097) (0.425)
Consumer services 0.063 -1.317*** 117
(0.075) (0.467)
Robust standard errors in brackets
note: ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1
Table 4.5: FE estimates for models V by industry category & sector
Using Foreign Technology 107
4.4.3 Further regressions
The OLS estimations that I conducted in the preceding section assume that the variable is
continuous and unbounded. Recall that the dependent variable is the share of entrepreneurs
using foreign technology in the production of their goods or services. It is thus a continuous
variable bounded between 0 and 1, with most of the observations stacked at either ends as seen
in Table 4.3. I can use OLS to estimate the equation but run the risk that the predicted values
of the dependent variable could be above or below its bound, i.e. 0 < Yˆ > 1. So I use the
two-limit or “doubly censored” Tobit estimation as recommended by Loudermilk (2007).
Figure 4.3: Dispersion of share of entrepreneurs using new technology, 2002–2004
First I pool the data and run the Tobit estimation, correcting for heteroscedasticity with
robust standard errors.20 I then run the panel random-effects Tobit regression and test whether
the pooled Tobit regression can be used. The likelihood ratio test reveal that I can use the
pooled Tobit estimation. The results of these pooled Tobit and Tobit random effects regressions
are in Section 4.5.1 of page 98 of the appendix.
I then run the pooled Tobit estimation and introduce the dummies for countries, thus running
a pseudo-fixed effects Tobit estimation.21 In addition, I correct for potential heteroscedasticity
20I further estimate our model using pooled Tobit estimation with country-cluster where the standard errors
are computed using the sandwich estimator. Result shows no significant difference from the first pooled Tobit
regression without cluster.
21I cannot run fixed-effects panel Tobit estimation in Stata.
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using robust standard errors. I later test whether the inclusion of country-specific effect into our
pooled two-limit Tobit model is appropriate using the likelihood ratio test and reject the null
hypothesis of no unobserved country effects.
Tobit
baseline I II III IV V
(coef/se) (coef/se) (coef/se) (coef/se) (coef/se) (coef/se)
Highly competitive market 1.462*** 1.351*** 1.274*** 1.451*** 1.216*** 1.273***
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.087)
Opportunity-based 1.328*** 1.264*** 1.252*** 1.322*** 1.216*** 1.245***
(0.096) (0.093) (0.090) (0.095) (0.089) (0.090)
GDP growth % -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.008* -0.007 -0.022*** -0.024***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
TRIPS -1.385*** -1.274***
(0.263) (0.301)
IMD 0.530*** 0.473*** 0.497***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.067)
TRIPS*IMD 0.029 -0.071***
(0.020) (0.024)
d(TRIPS) 4.531***
(0.919)
d(TRIPS)*IMD -0.594**
(0.282)
cons -0.033 9.709*** -1.884*** -0.712 8.938*** -4.282***
(0.075) (1.850) (0.234) (0.476) (2.479) (0.554)
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
lnσ -0.313*** -0.334*** -0.365*** -0.314*** -0.379*** -0.368***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Log-Likelihood -1’000.06 -986.49 -965.77 -999.17 -958.06 -963.96
χ2 546.965 567.018 579.752 550.581 595.087 581.382
McFadden’s R2 0.346 0.355 0.368 0.346 0.373 0.369
McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2 0.184 0.19 0.206 0.183 0.212 0.207
N 1’408 1’408 1’408 1’408 1’408 1’408
note: ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1
Robust standard errors in brackets.
McFadden’s and McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2 are reported for completeness
Table 4.6: Pooled Tobit estimation with country effects
However, I encounter a problem with the Tobit estimation in that its marginal effect for most
of the explanatory variables are above the value 1. The marginal effect of the Tobit estimation
can be interpreted in a similar manner as the OLS estimates. If we believe the Tobit estimation
of the dependent variable, we find that a unit increase in TRIPS compliance, TRIPS, leads to
a decrease in the share of local entrepreneurs using new technologies by 1.4 units (corresponds
to estimate in column II), which implies that TRIPS de jure implementation reduces the share
of entrepreneurs by over 100%. However the sign and significance of the variables of interest
TRIPS index, its enforcement and the interaction of the index and the enforcement term concur
with the OLS estimates. This regression method deserves more study.
I also run probit estimation to check both the robustness of the Tobit and OLS estimation
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results. I collapse the continuous dependent variable into binary outcomes variable by using the
mean value of our dependent variable as separator. Observations of the dependent variable with
values above 0.421266 are assigned 1 and 0 otherwise. I also tested a different separator value,
the median of the dependent variable, but find that the direction and significance of impact does
not differ. The estimates from the probit regression with country effects largely agrees with our
pooled Tobit estimation with country-specific effects. I report the result of the probit regression
in Table 4.13 on page 119 of the appendix.
4.4.4 Future research
In the near future I hope to conduct detailed analysis of the current research by trying to
determine how entrepreneurs in developing countries with differing imitative abilities react to
TRIPS implementation. I did not conduct this analysis here because of the limited sample of
countries and because they have similar imitative abilities. Breaking the countries into their
levels of imitative abilities, measured by the ArCo technological index of Archibugi and Coco
(2004), shows that we have three leaders, three potential leaders, seven latecomers, and one
marginalized country. However the fact there are unbalanced observations per country over the
period of study poses a concern for me.
In addition I would like to pursue the estimations of the Tobit regression further. Model
V of the Tobit regression in Table 4.6 shows that countries fully compliant with their TRIPS
obligations have 450% more entrepreneurs exploiting new technologies than the rest. While the
estimate itself is high, the sign of this marginal effect suggests that there is difference between
countries who have completely complied with their TRIPS obligations and those who haven’t.
The FE estimation did not capture this impact since the regression method drops any variable
that does not change over time. Most of the changes in the TRIPS index for countries in this
sample are for those with TRIPS index values between 0 and 6.
Needless to say, I would like to re-run the regressions here with more observations per country,
per sector and for more years.
4.5 Conclusion
I attempt to study how developing countries’ implementation of the TRIPS agreement may
influence access to new technology. I exploit the GEM data on new entrepreneurs’ use of new
technology in their production of goods or services to investigate the impact.
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In answering the first proposition I find that TRIPS implementation adversely influences
local entrepreneurs’ use of new technology. This evidence implies any possible access to new
technology may be outweighed by the increase in cost to acquire and later exploit that technology.
Considering that the bulk of developing countries in this sample has potential to imitate foreign
technology, the results presented here is contrary to argument that strengthened IPR protection
would encourage more exploitation of new foreign technologies. Instead, they lend support to
the argument that strengthened IPR system creates higher barrier to using technologies from
abroad for developing countries.
A possible explanation for this reduction could be that entrepreneurs now face higher cost of
exploiting the foreign technologies due to the strengthened IPR protection. For example, pirated
copies of new softwares could be made scant in countries enforcing their TRIPS obligations.
Therefore locals would have to pay the higher price of using the copyrighted softwares rather
than paying the cost of reproducing the pirated versions. However, this is could be short-run
effect of TRIPS implementation.
While strengthening of IPR protection in these developing countries have adversely affected
the entrepreneurs using foreign technologies, the IPR reform also brings more inflow of foreign
technologies and activities to the countries via the traditional channels of exposure: trade, FDI
and licensing, as I have shown in the previous chapter. Depending on how these channels of
exposure take place, the local knowledge pool could increase thereby building the countries’
innovative capacities. Therefore in the long-run, it is possible that the benefits to increased
access to foreign technologies outweighs the cost of reduction in share of local entrepreneurs
using foreign technologies. However, more study into this matter will have to be conducted.
4.5.1 Limitation
The evidence produced in this paper show that TRIPS implementation adversely affects en-
trepreneurs’ exploitation of new technology. This may be partially mitigated by weak IPR
enforcement. However, our result is not without limitations.
Firstly, capturing entrepreneurial activities across countries is a difficult endeavor. Even
with the standardized questionnaire and survey design that attempt to capture entrepreneurial
activity, the result may be influenced by the domestic culture. Respondents in some countries
may be overly optimistic in their answers in comparison to others, leading to an overestimation
of entrepreneurial activity in these particular countries.
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Secondly, responses to the question that I am interested in, the exploitation of foreign tech-
nology, assumes that the respondent knows her market well. It is unlikely that an entrepreneur is
fully aware of the kinds of technology considered new to the market, especially at the beginning
of the start-up.
Thirdly, I assume that the identification of the industry sectors of participation at the 4-digit
level are accurate. This is problematic especially for nascent entrepreneurs who may not know
which area they would be operating in. However, I have tried to circumvent this problem by
looking at the aggregated industry categories and the 1-digit sector level.
In addition, I would prefer to have more numbers of observations for entrepreneurs at every
sectorial level. It would be prudent to repeat this exercise I have undertaken here in the future
when more observations have been gathered.
Turning away from problems of using the GEM data, the TRIPS implementation variable
may be an inadequate attempt at quantifying legislation changes but it is the only available
index that reasonably tries to measure the changes. The construction of this index is based
on the broad obligations highlighted in the Agreement. It does not take into consideration the
different legal nuances and interpretations of the provisions which each country may adopt.
And lastly, the variable for TRIPS enforcement is based on the average response of senior
business leaders to the question of whether local IPR protection is adequate. The response of
the business leaders would depend on their familiarity with the local business environment, and
how they judge the term “adequate”.
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APPENDIX
Countries in the sample
Geographical region Countries ArCo classification
Asia Hong Kong, China leader
India latecomer
South Korea leader
Singapore leader
Thailand latecomer
Latin America Argentina potential leader
Brazil latecomer
Chile potential leader
Mexico latecomer
Peru latecomer
Venezuela latecomer
Africa South Africa latecomer
Uganda marginalized
Europe Poland potential leader
The ArCo technological capabilities indicator classify countries according to the country’s
creation of technology capabilities, the technological infrastructures and the development of
human skills. The countries are then subdivided into four main groups: leader, potential leader,
latecomers and marginalized. Leaders are the group of countries with ability to create and sustain
technological innovation. Potential latecomers have invested in the necessary infrastructure, such
as human capital and technological infrastructure, to build the countries’ innovative capacity
but have yet to achieve significant levels of innovation. Latecomers refer to countries that are in
the process of building their human capital and technological infrastructure concurrently. And
lastly, the marginalized are group of countries that do not even have significant access to “old”
technologies. They mostly consist of least-developed countries.
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Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Dependent variable:
Use new technology 1536 0.421266 0.432296 0 1
IPR variables:
TRIPS 1536 5.703885 2.227044 0.833333 7
IMD 1409 5.471065 1.404857 3.08 8.06
d(TRIPS)=1 (if country meets full compliance) 1536 0.539714 0.498583 0 1
TRIPS*IMD 1409 30.09207 13.70749 4.966667 54.93333
d(TRIPS)*IMD 1409 2.634798 2.529688 0 6.49
Control variables (Z):
Highly competitive market 1536 0.262661 0.369658 0 1
Opportunity-based reason 1536 0.239737 0.358647 0 1
GDP growth 1536 4.009686 5.328753 -10.8945 17.85457
Table 4.7: Descriptive statistics
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Proposition 2
FE estimations of models I – III
I II III N
TRIPS IMD TRIPS*IMD
(coef/se) (coef/se) (coef/se)
4 categories
Extractive 0.299 0.248** -0.041 97
(0.486) (0.116) (0.037)
Transforming -0.640*** 0.249*** 0.021** 539
(0.108) (0.046) (0.010)
Business service 0.033 0.187*** -0.015 248
(0.196) (0.064) (0.012)
Consumer oriented -0.391** 0.200*** -0.005 524
(0.155) (0.037) (0.011)
SIC 1-digit
Agriculture, forestry, hunting, fishing 0.299 0.248** -0.041 89
(0.487) (0.116) (0.037)
Mining, construction -0.868*** 0.329*** 0.047** 67
(0.161) (0.074) (0.020)
Manufacturing -0.520** 0.386*** 0.013 258
(0.252) (0.088) (0.020)
Transportation, communications, utilities -0.693*** 0.121 0.031* 105
(0.133) (0.098) (0.018)
Wholesale, motor vehicles sales, repair -0.453* 0.105* -0.004 143
(0.258) (0.059) (0.016)
Retail, hotel, restaurant (drop) -0.202** 0.034 47
(0.088) (0.047)
Financial, insurance, real estate -0.553*** 0.278*** 0.002 278
(0.181) (0.052) (0.015)
Business service -0.017 0.173** -0.010 201
(0.192) (0.073) (0.012)
Health, education, social services 0.082 0.033 -0.011 103
(0.443) (0.086) (0.026)
Consumer services -0.446 0.169** -0.021 117
(0.368) (0.071) (0.030)
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1
Robust std. errors in brackets
Table 4.10: FE estimations on models I – III
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This collection of three research papers attempts to answer the question of whether strength-
ening intellectual property rights (IPR) through the implementation of Trade-related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement encourages access to foreign technologies for
developing countries.
5.1 Summary
In my first paper I underscore how the TRIPS agreement, harmonized global IPR protection, is
different from previous international IPR agreements. I then make the case that available indexes
such as the Ginarte and Park (1997) and Rapp and Rozek (1990) do not capture countries’
implementation of the TRIPS and proceed to build my own index. I consult national IPR
legislations, various IPR-specific reports, and legal experts and practitioners, whenever possible,
to construct the index for 53 developing countries for the period 1994 – 2007. Analysis of the
data collected shows three implementation trends. Firstly, almost all developing countries profit
from the transition period clause of the Agreement (Art. 65), and in some cases exceeding the
implementation deadline. Secondly, implementation efforts of developing countries vary, and
not necessarily because of their income levels. And lastly, countries in regional trade agreements
(RTAs) that include IPR obligations tend to comply with TRIPS earlier than the rest. The
results confirm that the TRIPS agreement leads to a convergence of global IPR protection
across countries. It also makes the case that the Agreement’s implementation is an external
factor, not entirely influenced by the country’s level of economic development.
I then proceed to use the index I built in my first paper to examine whether TRIPS im-
plementation increases access to foreign technology for developing countries. Controlling for
country-specific factors, I find that developing countries’ compliance with the TRIPS agreement
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increases access to foreign technology through foreign direct investment (FDI) and licensing.
When I include an enforcement term to proxy for actual enforcement of the TRIPS obligations,
I observe significant impact of the TRIPS implementation on all three channels of access to
foreign technologies which varies according to their imitative abilities.
The last paper investigates how TRIPS implementation affect local exploitation of foreign
technologies. Using the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) database on entrepreneurship,
I find significant and adverse effects of TRIPS. The level of impact changes according to the
industrial sectors and categories of the entrepreneurial activities. The results show that stronger
IPR protection, via TRIPS implementation, raises the cost to using new technology by the
entrepreneurs in developing countries. I suggest that TRIPS’ negative effect on the exploitation
of foreign technologies in developing countries may be attributable to the higher cost of acquiring
them.
5.2 Reflections
Access to foreign technologies is important for many developing countries. The spillover ben-
efits for in tapping into the global knowledge pool allows developing countries to profit from
research and development (R&D) conducted elsewhere and access technologies that work, thus
minimizing duplicative costs of re-inventing these technologies on their own. In addition, it is
not obvious if countries that have little imitative abilities can re-engineer the existing technolo-
gies on their own. Thus by accessing foreign technologies, developing countries can endeavor to
catch up to developed countries.
The relevant issue is then to answer this three part question: (i) whether the institution-
alization of IPR regime facilitates this access to foreign technology, (ii) if IPR regime affects
the exploitation of this foreign technology, and (iii) if the access and exploitation of foreign
technologies is beneficial for developing countries to build its own capacity to innovate.
In my second research paper, I find that implementation of the TRIPS agreement does facili-
tate developing countries’ access to foreign technologies, through trade, foreign direct investment
and licensing activities. So my answer to the first part of the question is “most likely.”
Results from the third paper shows that TRIPS implementation reduces the exploitation of
foreign technologies in developing countries. Therefore, while the implementation of the Agree-
ment facilitates access to foreign technologies, it reduces local exploitation of these technologies.
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Based on the result of this single study here, the answer to question (ii) is “no.” However, more
investigation in this subject matter is needed.
More access to but less use of foreign technology because of strengthened IPR rights leads to
an uncertain answer for the last part of the question above. This question can only be answered
when there is more evidence to study the subject matter. But I proceed to discuss how this last
question could be answered.
5.3 Developing own technology
The leap from accessing, exploiting and learning from foreign technologies, to build developing
countries’ own capacities to innovate is big. The only way to tackle this question is to analyze
it according to need for the technology and countries’ absorptive capacities.1
Firstly, assuming that developing countries have access to foreign technologies, they would
have to use these technologies in order to learn from them. And in order to learn from these
technologies, developing countries need to have some level of absorptive capacities. But if
the access to foreign technologies is dependent on strengthened IPR regimes, then it becomes
more difficult for developing countries to use these technologies without incurring licensing fee.
Countries that used to profit from using pirated softwares, for example, would now have to pay
the licensing fee for using the original software which can be a significant cost burden. If users
in those countries affected cannot pay the licensing fee then they would have to stop using it
altogether. This would be a negative impact, albeit extreme, of TRIPS compliance.
Even if developing countries have access to foreign technologies and the cost of exploiting
the technologies does not pose a significant burden, technologies that are not relevant for these
countries will not be used. As Trajtenberg (2008) argues, the types of technologies that are
useful for developing countries are the ones that are adapted to the local conditions, not the
latest technological gadgets.
Therefore the cost of using and the usefulness of the foreign technology to local markets
influence developing countries’ exploitation of foreign technologies.
Secondly, learning from foreign technologies is highly dependent on the countries’ level of
absorptive capacities. Lall (2003) makes a convincing argument that countries that will profit
from strengthened IPR protection are the ones with some level of innovative abilities. The
1I use the term absorptive capacity in a general manner.
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same can be applied to countries who endeavor to learn from foreign technologies. Countries
that have some absorptive capacities are likelier to benefit from accessing and exploiting foreign
technologies.
Take least-developed countries (LDCs) as an example. LDCs are known to have limited
human capital development and inadequate technology infrastructure. Thus they are unlikely
to learn from acquiring foreign technology unless the technology is of a general nature and
can be applied to the local market without any modification. For example, the introduction of
mobile phones in African countries inadvertently addressed the problem of inadequate telephone
network infrastructure, and significantly improved these countries’ productiveness in its daily
economic activities.
The TRIPS agreement imposes limits on how developing countries can learn from foreign
technologies to develop their own technological industries. Historically, countries have learnt
from one another’s technologies by reverse-engineering and copying these technologies. But
under TRIPS, blatant copying of new technologies are no longer possible. Therefore countries
who endeavor to develop their technological industries like South Korea, Taiwan, the United
States of America and some European countries have done, are no longer able to do so. Thus
any learning from technologies from abroad would have to be different from what most countries
have done historically.
Answering question (iii) proves to be difficult. TRIPS protection facilitates access to foreign
technologies but it may raise the barrier of exploiting the technology. In addition, TRIPS pro-
tection narrows the policy space for developing countries to pursue policies that may help them
develop their technological industries, as other industrialized and newly industrializing countries
have done. Therefore new avenues of research would need to be conducted in order to address
the issue of how to build innovative capacities when constrained under TRIPS protection. A
possible solution lies in the example of open source platform for software development (see Ghosh
and Soete, 2006; Arora and Nandkumar, 2007). Moreover, even if a developing country imple-
ments the TRIPS agreement fully, it could use the information gleaned from patent application
of foreign technology at a different patent office and use it locally, especially if the rights holder
of that technology does not file for patent application in the particular country.
The heart of the matter is that we need more time to gather evidences on how TRIPS
affects developing countries. Showing how TRIPS influences access to foreign technologies is
not enough, it is prudent to also examine how this increased access translates into more use of
these technologies.
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5.4 Data availability
A big portion of my research work was dedicated to finding data on developing countries. There
were several times that I started collecting data for developing countries only to realize half-way
that the reliability of those data were questionable. For example, patent database.
Information contained in patent application is highly useful to conduct studies on innovative
activities across countries. I attempted to collect patent application at local patent offices using
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) database. Unfortunately, I was made
aware that this database has a double-counting problem. So while the information contained
within the WIPO application is useful as an indicator of intention to patent in specific countries,
it cannot be used as an indicator of actual patenting in those countries.2 I also attempted to
use the PATSTAT database, which addresses the issue of double-counting and simplifies search
of patent application for several countries at once. Unfortunately, the data I collected had many
missing values and its reliability was hard to confirm. As a last effort, I tried to obtain patent
data from national patent offices, for example for Malaysia, but was informed that there may
be problems in accessing the data because of administrative and bureaucratic reasons. I had 52
other national patent offices to contact in order to complete my data collection, and seeing how
difficult it was to collect for a country like Malaysia, I abandon this search.
If it weren’t for organizations like the United Nations, the World Bank, or the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), data collection for developing countries would be almost impos-
sible. However, there are some database that require some “financial contribution” regardless
of whether you are researching for academic purposes or not. As a budget constrained PhD
student this cost posed a significant barrier for me and so most of the data collected for this
research were obtained by using databases that were “free-of-charge.”
Lastly, we need new measures to capture “innovation” in developing countries. In order to
design well informed based policies, data on innovative activities in developing countries need
to be collected. Lack of data on innovation in these countries does not mean that there are no
innovative activities taking place. Rather, it is our inability to capture these activities that is
inadequate. Recent developments to conduct innovation surveys in developing countries, such
as Africa, is a good step in the right direction (see Gault, 2008).
2Filing patent application at WIPO simplifies the administrative procedure of filing in several patent offices.
Inventors can indicate which countries that they would be applying for patent grant in the WIPO patent ap-
plication filing. However, the inventor would need to go through the national phase of actually applying to the
national patent offices in order to receive her patent grant.
126 Conclusion
5.5 Outlook
There is still so much to learn about how developing countries are affected by their current TRIPS
obligations. There are three aspects to understanding how TRIPS may impact developing
countries’ economic activities. The first aspect is in regards to accessing the global pool of
knowledge. The second is in regards to building innovative capacities, and the last is to sustain,
if not improve, the level of innovative activities. For most developing countries, and especially
LDCs, the first two aspects to examining TRIPS are crucial.
While current research show that countries who do implement IPR protection gain better
access to foreign technologies, the issue is not clear in regards to how this IPR regime will
help developing countries build their innovative capacities. The TRIPS agreement, when read
together with other WTO-related agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) and Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) to name a few, bind devel-
oping countries to develop their innovative capacities in an open trading framework. This is a
feat that has not been done before. Given that there are no data collectible on this subject mat-
ter, country case studies should be conducted to examine what other policies these developing
countries are pursuing in order to build their innovative capacities. For example, when countries
like Qatar attract skilled foreign labor to their countries to fill in open positions that cannot be
filled by locals because of their lack of technological expertise.
Another interesting avenue of research would be to study how innovative activities in firms of
developing countries are affected by the TRIPS agreement. Several countries such as Malaysia
and Brazil have undertaken to run the innovation survey based on the European Community
Innovation Survey (CIS). Exploiting these national innovation survey could yield interesting
results to understand how TRIPS is influencing innovative activities in developing countries.
Many studies have focused on the problem of access to medicine for developing countries,
which is an integral part of the TRIPS agreement. But there are other components of TRIPS
which should be explored, for example in regards to copyright, traditional knowledge, geograph-
ical indications and industrial design to name a few. The World Bank publication edited by
Finger and Schuler (2004) highlight various kinds of “poor people’s knowledge” that may be
protected under TRIPS agreement and could benefit these countries. Further studies on this
subject matter would be highly welcomed.
There are many more research possibilities in this area of understanding TRIPS and its
impact on developing countries. I have highlighted the three that I think are interesting and
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would be useful to understand so as to ensure that TRIPS is beneficial for developing countries.
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